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By investigating the works of Polybius and Livy, we can discuss an important 
aspect of the impact of Alexander upon the reputation and image of Rome. Because 
of the subject of their histories and the political atmosphere in which they were 
writing - these authors, despite their generally positive opinions of Alexander, 
ultimately created scenarios where they portrayed the Romans as superior to the 
Macedonian king. This study has five primary goals: to produce a commentary on the 
various Alexander passages found in Polybius’ and Livy’s histories; to establish the 
generally positive opinion of Alexander held by these two writers; to illustrate that a 
noticeable theme of their works is the ongoing comparison between Alexander and 
Rome; to demonstrate Polybius’ and Livy’s belief in Roman superiority, even over 
Alexander; and finally to create an understanding of how this motif influences their 
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The influence of Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.E.) on Roman military 
actions and cultural expression was significant during the mid and late Republican 
periods (274-28 B.C.E.), the Principate (27 B.C.E.-283 C.E.), and even during the 
Dominate (284-476 C.E.). Several prominent Roman statesmen emulated the great king 
and attempted to follow in his military footsteps.
1
 This study will investigate the 
influence of Alexander the Great on the Roman world of the mid and late Republican 
periods, also focusing on the effects that the great Macedonian had on the ever evolving 
concept of what it meant to be Roman during the Romans’ rise to hegemony over the 
eastern Mediterranean. Through comparisons and associations of Alexander and his 
accomplishments with the Roman state, the Romans came to define further what it meant 
to be Roman.  
The world that Alexander left behind in 323 B.C.E. considered the great king as 
unrivalled in military success. The Diadochi (or “Successors”) of Alexander were eager 
to share in his glory but were unable to match his military accomplishments. It was the 
Romans who came to contest the greatness of Alexander. The Romans respected his 
remarkable martial prowess, seeing themselves as the true successors of the world 
hegemony briefly created by Alexander. They too wished to share in his glory.  
                                                 
1
 The Romans found the military achievements and abilities of Alexander both culturally attractive 
and politically suitable for the necessary transition of power in the East from Hellenistic monarchies to a 
strong Roman authority. See Cornelius Clarkson Vermeule, Alexander the Great Conquers Rome 
(Cambridge, Mass: Sir Northwold Nuffler Foundation Press, 1986), 2. In addition, Pompey, Caesar, 
Antony, and Trajan all enthusiastically patterned themselves on the image and accomplishments of 
Alexander. Note Arthur M. Eckstein, “Conceptualizing Roman Imperial Expansion under the Republic: An 
Introduction,” in A Companion to the Roman Republic, ed. Robert Morstein-Marx and Nathan Rosenstein 




As the Romans rose to power steadily over the Mediterranean world in the third, 
second, and first centuries B.C.E., they came into contact and conflict with the various 
successor kingdoms created after Alexander’s death.
2
 Rome’s military victories over the 
Carthaginians in the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.E.) and over the successor 
kingdoms in the first half of the second century B.C.E. gave her a dominant position in 
the Mediterranean world. The power Rome was building in the West came to rival the 
power that Alexander had built in the East. Two of our main sources for the rise of Rome 
in the Mediterranean Basin are Polybius (ca. 150 B.C.E.) and Livy (ca. 15 B.C.E.). Both 
writers possessed a deep respect for the vast accomplishments of Alexander; however, 
they believed that another power was greater, Rome. This study will discuss the image of 
Alexander in the writings of Polybius and Livy. In addition, it will demonstrate how these 
writers employed his image to construct a concept of Roman superiority and to champion 
Roman virtues and abilities.  
Unlike the examples of Roman admiration or emulation of Alexander the Great 
found in most Roman sources concerning Alexander and his achievements, these two 
writers, Polybius and Livy, addressed the impact and importance of Alexander in a 
different and sometimes less flattering manner. A major subject of their histories, i.e. the 
rise of Rome to supremacy in the Mediterranean world, lent itself to comparisons with 
Alexander. The conflicts between the Hellenistic states created after Alexander’s death 
and Rome during the late third and second centuries B.C.E. are at the center of Polybius’ 
                                                 
2
 These were most notably the Antigonid Kingdom in Macedonia, the Seleucid Empire based in 







 Additionally, the tension between Macedon and the Achaean League 
is present in Polybius’s history. The actions of the Hellenistic states and their interaction 
with Rome thus are of fundamental importance. Rome came to dominate a large section 
of the world once ruled by Alexander; this point is not lost on Polybius and Livy. These 
aspects undoubtedly had an effect on their portrayal of Alexander and give us an 
important and different perspective on the relationship created between Rome and the 
great Macedonian.  
For the audience, certain questions are raised by Polybius’ and Livy’s accounts. 
Was Alexander really as great as he is thought to be? Was he a friend or an enemy of the 
Greeks? Were the Romans superior to him? Could Alexander have conquered the 
Romans? Polybius and Livy address these themes throughout their works. Although 
respect for Alexander is clearly visible, one crucial theme permeates these men’s 
histories: Alexander may have been great, but the Romans were greater. Their accounts 
advance this motif both directly and indirectly. The Romans are established as 
Alexander’s true successor, as hegemon of the world, and the extent of their hegemony 
and the manner in which they achieved this glory are described as superior. Both writers 
convey the relationship between Alexander and the Romans in a different manner than 
most of our other ancient sources. Instead of transparent examples of emulation and 
praise, in Polybius and Livy we find resistance to the idea of Alexander’s universal 
                                                 
3
 It is important to note that since Livy often used Polybius as his principle source, especially for 
his accounts of the eastern Mediterranean, many of the points that I argue herein, concerning Livy, also 
reflect similarly on Polybius. See Heinrich Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten 
und fünften Dekade des Livius (Berlin, 1863), 249, 254, and 341; and F. W. Walbank, A Historical 





superiority in military greatness. This comes in the form of an ongoing competitive 
comparison between Rome and Alexander.  
By investigating the works of Polybius and Livy, we can discuss and understand 
an important aspect of the impact of Alexander the Great upon the reputation and image 
of Rome. This study hopes to illustrate that because of the subject of their histories - 
namely the rise of Rome to Mediterranean dominance, and due to the political 
atmosphere in which Polybius and Livy were writing, namely Rome’s establishment of 
hegemony over the Greek east for Polybius and the complete submission of the 
Mediterranean basin under Augustine Rome for Livy - these authors, despite their 
generally positive opinions of Alexander, ultimately created scenarios where they 
portrayed the Romans as superior to the Macedonian king. 
In order to legitimize Roman achievements, Polybius and Livy were forced to use 
Alexander as a backdrop since he had set the bar to which all others strove to grasp. 
Thus, these men depict Alexander as the optimum counterpoint to Rome. Yet, the desire 
to praise Roman accomplishments often leads to unfair and misleading arguments. This 
study will discuss where these comparisons arise in their texts, in order to demonstrate 
that Alexander’s impact on Polybius and Livy, although their accounts differ from the 
traditional “Alexander historians,” is no less fruitful or important to our further 
understanding of Alexander’s influence on the Romans and the recording of their history. 
Ultimately, this study has five primary goals: to produce a distinctive commentary on the 
various passages found in Polybius’ and Livy’s histories where they either directly 
mention Alexander or where we can infer an Alexander reference from the contexts; to 




illustrate that a noticeable theme of their works is the ongoing comparison between 
Alexander and Rome; to demonstrate that Polybius and Livy thought that the Romans 
were superior even to Alexander; and finally to create an understanding of how this motif 
influences their greater narratives and alters our appreciation of their works.  
The Romans conquered bearded barbarians and sophisticated Greeks, daring 
Carthaginians and mighty Hellenic kings; yet through all this, the reputation of Alexander 
had remained insurmountable. With the rise of Rome to supremacy over the 
Mediterranean, this was the occasion to challenge Alexander’s position as the greatest 
conqueror of all time. Polybius and Livy both believed this and their histories reflect it. It 
was first necessary to associate the Romans with Alexander and then to represent them as 
superior to him.
4
 In the arena of war, the image of Alexander came to help establish what 
it meant to be Roman and, at the international level, who the Romans were. Alexander 
became the prime example of what to do and what not to do.
5
 Polybius and Livy 
understood the power that his name evoked and they used this power to express Rome’s 
rise to unmatched preeminence through the comparisons with Alexander. The military 
vigor and the vast accomplishments of Alexander were something to emulate and respect. 
                                                 
4
 Livy especially adopted this “one versus many” motif in his digression on Alexander. See Ruth 
Morello, “Livy’s Alexander Digression (9.17-19): Counterfactuals and Apologetics,” Journal of Roman 
Studies 92 (2002): 69. 
5
 S. P. Oakley, A Commentary on Livy, Books VI-X: Volume III: Book IX (New York, NY: Oxford 




Yet, for these two writers, although Alexander may have been great, the Romans were 
greater.
6 
                                                 
6
 We see a similar theme involving Cato the Elder’s opinion of Roman superiority to the Hellenic 
world. Cato did not view Hellenism negatively; rather, he recognized its qualities. However, he ultimately 
saw it as inferior. For Cato, Rome was not only politically and militarily superior, but also culturally 
superior. This has clear parallels with Polybius’ and Livy’s opinions, although Polybius’ opinion is 
especially interesting since he was a Greek. For the Catonian theme of the Greeks as great, but the Romans 
as greater, see Erich S. Gruen, Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 





Polybius the Statesman and Author 
During the Roman Republic, famous writers such as Polybius and Livy discussed 
Alexander mostly in comparison to and in potential conflict with the Roman military. 
Compared to the numerous examples of Alexander admiration, emulation, or apologetic 
that ancient writers usually recorded, this is a different form of influence that Alexander 
had on the conceptions of Roman history. Instead of citing multiple examples of the 
Roman fascination with and reverence toward the great king, like those that would 
become common during the first century B.C.E. to the fourth century C.E., both Polybius 
and Livy argued for the superiority of the Romans over the great Macedonian.
7
 
To be clear, Polybius was not a Roman. He was a political prisoner from Achaea 
held in the custody of the Romans. Still, he also possessed a privileged position in Rome 
with access to the highest strata of Roman society. While in Rome, he became concerned 
with the recording of Roman history and Roman interactions within the ancient 
Mediterranean world. As it happens, he is our earliest surviving written source on 
                                                 
7
 As we shall see, men of the Roman mid-Republic such as Lucius Papirius Cursor and Publius 
Cornelius Scipio Africanus were likened to Alexander. The tradition of associating Roman statesmen with 
Alexander existed long before its popularization during the Roman Empire. Alexander’s influence was 
especially felt during the Late Republic under the mighty statesmen Pompey, Caesar, Crassus, and Antony, 
all of whom emulated the great king and attempted to follow in his footsteps. Crassus and Antony both 
organized and led campaigns into the East, while Caesar and Pompey, who did not campaign against the 
Parthian East, have both been likened to the Macedonian king multiple times through images and text. The 
later emperors were in an even more advantageous position to emulate Alexander, through their campaigns 
and public works, than the majority of their republican counterparts simply because they commanded more 
economic, political, and social power. The trend of Alexander emulation did not lose steam as the years 






 The majority of histories involving Alexander come from writers of the 
Principate, most notably the biographers Arrian and Curtius Rufus, though their histories 
are based on accounts of Alexander that were near-contemporary with his life.  
Although Alexander’s life is not the focus of Polybius’ work, what Polybius 
records about Alexander and the Roman association with him is significant to our 
understanding of Alexander’s impact on the conceptualization of Rome’s rise to 
dominance. Richard Billows relates that “there are fourteen passages in Polybius which 
express substantial and interesting views of our judgments concerning Alexander.”
9
 As a 
Greek statesman living and writing during the mid-second century B.C.E., Polybius’ 
opinion on the Roman relationship with Alexander and his Macedonian successors offers 
a distinctive and important perspective. This perspective is one of the points of emphasis 
for this study.  
One must note that Polybius, through all his discussions of Roman and 
Macedonian relations and his comparisons between Rome and Macedon, did not address 
Alexander directly in some cases. For instance, in his digression on the Macedonian 
phalanx, he describes mostly the Macedonians of the late third and early second centuries 
B.C.E., not the Macedonians of Alexander’s day. However, Polybius chose this 
comparison because, in this case, his subject was the superiority of the Roman manipular 
legion over the Macedonian pikeman phalanx that the Romans confronted in the wars 
against Alexander’s successors. Even so, it is still appropriate to discuss Polybius’ 
comparison of the manipular legion and pikeman phalanx clash because he characterizes 
                                                 
8
 Richard Billows, “Polybius and Alexander Historiography,” in Alexander the Great in Fact and 
Fiction, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2000), 288. 
 
9





the superiority of the former over the latter. The makeup and tactics of the Macedonian 
phalanx had changed since the days of Philip II and Alexander the Great, and potentially 
in adverse ways (namely additional depth limiting flexibility and less emphasis on a 
dominant heavy cavalry wing); but the tactics and equipment would not have appeared 
completely foreign to these men.
10
 The Romans conquered much of the Mediterranean 
world with their manipular legions just as Alexander conquered much of the ancient 
world with the pikeman phalanx army. The indirect comparison of Alexander and Rome 
thus is not lost on the reader. In addition, Polybius makes no distinction between King 
Perseus’ Macedonian army in the mid-second century B.C.E. and that of Alexander, 
which makes the comparison with the Roman legion all the more interesting. Apart from 
this digression, what we must emphasize is Polybius’ preference of the Romans over 
Alexander the Great and his reasoning for these arguments.  
Polybius was born in Arcadia near the end of the third century B.C.E. to a wealthy 
family. He began writing at a young age but also became involved in politics. By the 
170s B.C.E., Polybius was climbing steadily up the political ladder of the Achaean 
League and ultimately was elected hipparchus, the Achaean second in command and 
traditional leader of the cavalry, in 170/69 B.C.E. Polybius was poised to be elected 
strategos, the highest position of the Achaean League; however, this would not come to 
fruition. Rome was at war with Macedon in the Third Macedonian War against King 
Perseus. With the King’s utter defeat at Pydna in 168 B.C.E., the Romans purged the 
political elites of Greece, including Polybius, whom the Romans sent to Italy as a 
                                                 
10
 John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons, Warriors 
and Warfare in the Ancient Civilisations of Greece and Rome, ed. Philip de Ste. Croix (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 68, 73-74. Also, see Brian Todd Carey, Warfare in the Ancient World (South 




political prisoner. Once in Rome, he befriended Scipio Aemilianus and gained access to 
the Roman upper class. As the friend of many influential Roman aristocrats, Polybius 
received leave to travel the Roman world, making trips to Africa, Spain, and Gaul. 
Polybius witnessed the sack of Carthage in the Third Punic War firsthand.
11
 Through his 
travels, he viewed the various landscapes of Rome’s conquests and conducted interviews 
with former soldiers and officials, such as Scipio Africanus, and even the King of 
Numidia, Masinissa, who personally had known Hannibal.
12
 Maybe most important of all 
was that he observed and recorded the Roman legion of his time in combat. If one 
combines this with his significant familiarity with Greek military knowledge, which he 
possessed from his political and military posts in Greece, then one can see that Polybius 
had the ability to give firsthand and knowledgeable insight from both sides.
 13
  As a 
Greek aristocrat and statesman, he was also familiar with the life and actions of 
Alexander the Great, which his Alexander sections illustrate.  
Defender of the Greatness of Philip II, Alexander, and the Macedonians of Their Period  
There should be no doubt that Polybius respected the accomplishments of 
Alexander. Hence, he states, “The successes that were achieved by Alexander after his 
father’s death won for them [the Macedonians] a reputation for valor which has been 
universally recognized by posterity.”
14
 Praise of the Macedonians of Philip’s and 
Alexander’s time was not universal in Greece; this is demonstrated in the arguments of 
                                                 
11
 F. W. Walbank, Polybius: the Rise of the Roman Empire, trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert (New York: 
Penguin Putnam Inc., 1979), 12-14. 
 
12
 Ibid. 14. 
 
13
 Ibid. 12-13. 
 
14





Demosthenes, Theopompus, and Chlaeneas, just to name a few.
15
 However, Polybius 
made it a point to defend these kings and their character against the attacks of previous 
historians. Polybius, arguing how to write history correctly, states, “My own opinion is 
that we should neither revile nor extol kings falsely, as has so often been done, but 
always give an account of them consistent with our previous statements and in accord 
with the character of each.”
16
 Polybius labels Theopompus as a writer who failed in this 
standard arguing, “In this respect Theopompus is one of the writers who is most to 
blame.”
17
 Polybius records Theopompus’ opinion of Philip II and his court as follows: 
At the outset of his [Theopompus’] history of Philip, son of Amyntas, he 
states that what chiefly induced him to undertake this work was that 
Europe had never produced such a man before as this Philip; and yet 
immediately afterwards in his preface and throughout the book he shows 
him [Philip] to have been first so promiscuous with women, that he did 
everything in his power to ruin his own home by his passionate and 
ostentatious addiction to this kind of thing; next a most wicked and 
mischievous man in his schemes for forming friendships and alliances; 
thirdly, one who had enslaved and betrayed a large number of cities by 
force or fraud; and lastly, one so addicted to strong drink that he was 
frequently seen by his friends manifestly drunk in broad daylight. Anyone 
who chooses to read the beginning of his forty-ninth Book will be amazed 
at the extravagance of this writer. Apart from other things, he has ventured 
to write as follows. I set down the passage in his own words: “Philip's 
court in Macedonia was the gathering-place of all the most debauched and 
brazen-faced characters in Greece or abroad, who were there styled the 
king's companions. For Philip in general showed no favor to men of good 
repute who were careful of their property, but those he honored and 
promoted were spendthrifts who passed their time drinking and gambling. 
In consequence he not only encouraged them in their vices, but made them 
past masters in every kind of wickedness and lewdness. Was there 
anything indeed disgraceful and shocking that they did not practice, and 
was there anything good and creditable that they did not leave undone? 
Some of them used to shave their bodies and make them smooth although 
                                                 
15
 See Dem. First Philippic, Second Philippic, and Third Philippic; and Polyb. 8.10 and 9.28-39 
16
 Polyb. 8.8.7 
17




they were men, and others actually practiced lewdness with each other 
though bearded. While carrying about two or three minions with them they 
served others in the same capacity, so that we would be justified in calling 
them not courtiers but courtesans and not soldiers but male prostitutes. For 
being by nature man-slayers they became by their practices man-whores. 
In a word,” he continues, “not to drag out the subject, and especially as 
I am beset by such a mass of other matters, my opinion is that those who 
were called Philip's friends and companions were worse brutes and of a 
more beastly disposition than the Centaurs who established themselves on 





The passage portrays Philip as a sex addict, wicked, ruthless, untrustworthy, and as a 
drunk. It also describes his Macedonian court as a den of debauchery and disgraceful 
actions. Polybius remarks in stark opposition to Theopompus, “On the contrary, all those 
who were associated with Philip and later with Alexander showed themselves by their 
magnanimity, their daring, and their self-discipline to be truly royal.”
19
 Even though 
Theopompus is primarily discussing Philip II in passage 8.9, Polybius made it a point to 
defend those associated with Alexander as well.  
In fact, far from attacking Alexander, some of the pro-Macedonian arguments of 
Polybius are idealized and inaccurate. In his defense of Alexander and his subordinates, 
Polybius claims that “later, even though they came into possession of vast wealth and 
enjoyed unlimited opportunities to satisfy every desire, none of them suffered any 
deterioration of their physical strength for that reason, nor did they commit any unjust or 
licentious actions to gratify the demands of passion.”
20
 This claim is simply untrue and a 
clear example of idealizing the heroes of the past. Certainly, to cite just one example, 
                                                 
18
 Polyb. 8.9 
19








Cleitus the Black would have disagreed with such a statement when Alexander killed him 
in a drunken brawl in 328 B.C.E.
21
 The Macedonians enjoyed drinking and feasting.
22
 
Alexander carried on in this tradition with his debilitating and destructive drinking habits, 
which continued until his death.
23
  
What is important to draw from these passages is Polybius’ respect for Alexander 
and his accomplishments. Polybius develops this theme in his discussion of Callisthenes 
and Timaeus, where he praises Callisthenes, who lauded Alexander, stating, “Callisthenes 
praised a man [Alexander] whose spirit, by common consent, had in it something 
superhuman.”
24
 Polybius then argues that Timaeus deserved a far worse fate than 
Callisthenes since Timaeus wished to deify Timoleon, a relatively insignificant king of 
Syracuse, while Callisthenes had championed a far more worthy Alexander.
25
 Polybius, 
who did not ordinarily advocate a divine presence in humans, argues that Alexander was 
simply greater than a normal man.
26
 In an attack on the unworthy praise given to the 
allegedly minimal accomplishments of Timoleon by Timaeus soon after this, Polybius 
goes on to refer to Alexander as one of “the most illustrious heroes 
                                                 
21
 Curt. 8.1.20-52 
22
 At the town of Nysa, Alexander and his soldiers held a ten day drinking binge in honor of 
Dionysus. Arr. Anab. 5.1.1-3.4; Curt. 8.10.7-18; Plut. Alex. 58.3-5; and Just. 12.7.6-8  
23
 For Alexander’s destructive drinking habits, see Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 
B.C. A Historical Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 325, 360, 
378, 443, 453, 464, 473, 474, and 477.  Also, see Arr. Anab. 4.13-14, 4.8-9 passim, 7.24.4-25.1; Curt. 
8.1.19-8.2.12; Plut. Alex. 50-52, 75.3; Diod. 17.117.1-3; Julian. Caes. 330.B-C, 331.B-C; and Just. 12.6.1-
17 
24
 Polyb. 12.23 
 
25
 Callisthenes was arrested and tortured to death after he was implicated in a failed assassination 
attempt upon Alexander. See Arr. Anab. 4.14; Curt. 8.8; and Plut. Alex. 55.7 
26
 In his discussion of Lycurgus and Scipio Africanus, Polybius heavily emphasizes the use of 





(toiÍj e)pifanesta/toij tw½n h(rww̄n).”27 Such statements attest to the general admiration 
and respect felt by Polybius for Alexander. 
For Polybius, the benefits of Alexander’s actions were also apparent in his own 
generation. When describing the difficulties faced by earlier writers, Polybius notes the 
lack of free movement between Greece and much of the rest of the ancient world, which 
limited the scope and accuracy of Greek history writings.
28
 He then praises Alexander’s 
conquests when he states, “But in our own times, partly because of the empire which 
Alexander established in Asia and the Romans in other parts of the world, almost all 
regions have become approachable either by sea or land.”
29
 The underlying message in 
this statement should not go overlooked. The world in which Polybius lived was 
traversable as it had never been before, because of two mighty powers and their 
conquests. This situation allowed him and the other great minds of this period to engage 
in further research and expand their endeavors to a geographical scope never before 
possible. Polybius traversed many of the lands he discussed in his work and interviewed 
their peoples. He recognized that without Alexander the Great this feat would not have 
been easily achievable in the East, although ironically he never took up the opportunity to 
see the lands of the Far East firsthand, such as Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Susiane, Media, 
Mardoi, Paraetacene, Hyrcania, Parthia, Margiane, Areia, Drandiane, Arachosia, 
Carmania, Gedrosia, Parapamisos, Bactria, Sogdiana, and India.  
                                                 
27
 Polyb. 12.23 
 
28
 Note that Polybius referred to the ancient world of his time, thereby signifying the early Greek 
historians. Ibid. 3.59. 
 
29




Alexander opened up a larger world to the Greeks and Romans. The interstate 
system into which Rome came into contact in the East indirectly resulted from the 
conquests of Alexander. It is important to remember that without the campaigns of 
Alexander, which brought Hellenism to much of the eastern Mediterranean and the Far 
East, there would be no Alexandria or Antioch; there would not have been an Antiochus 
III or Cleopatra VII.
30
 The diffusion of Hellenism into the Near East caused by 
Alexander’s invasion was irreversible and came to influence the Roman occupation of the 
Near East well into Late Antiquity.
31
 Roman Republican history, including the works of 
Polybius and Livy, would be significantly different if Alexander had not conquered the 
Persian Empire and allowed for the creation of the Hellenistic kingdoms that followed his 
death.
32
 Therefore, the impact of Alexander on Polybius’ and Livy’s histories is not 
restricted to the sections in their writings mentioning Alexander by name. Polybius 
understood that the world was now larger and more accessible, owing to Alexander’s 
conquests in the East and the Roman expansions in the West. 
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In Polybius’ discussion of the traversable world of his time, it is significant that 
Polybius offers praise to only two parties, Alexander and Rome, when he certainly could 
have included other worthy candidates.
33
 This focused comparison of Rome and 
Alexander is quite consistent throughout Polybius’ work and implied even in his 
digression on the Macedonian phalanx discussed later. When Polybius equated the 
accomplishments of one man, i.e. Alexander, with the accomplishments of an entire 
people, i.e. the Romans, the purpose was deliberate. The comparable greatness of Rome 
and Alexander above all else required that they be linked in discussion. 
Polybius had a palpable respect for Alexander that influenced his work; yet, this 
high opinion does not compare to the one that he accorded the Romans. To Polybius, 
Alexander may have been great, but the Romans ultimately were greater. Diana Spencer 
recognizes that Polybius created a relationship between the Romans and Alexander when 
she addresses his work as emphasizing the Romans as the new power replacing the 
prestige of Alexander, stating, “Thus in Polybius we may be seeing the beginning of the 
story that would later have Livy characterize Rome itself as the super-Alexander.”
34
 
Nevertheless, we find this characterization already in Polybius. However, instead of 
simply praising Alexander, or giving concrete examples of Roman statesmen emulating 
the great king, Polybius developed a formula of asserting that whatever the Macedonians 
could do, the Romans could do better, including the exploits of Alexander the Great.  
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A Challenge to the Idea of the Unequalled Scope of Alexander’s Conquests 
Polybius emphasized from the very beginning of his work this theme of asserting 
that Roman accomplishments were greater than those of Alexander. In addressing the far-
reaching conquests of both Rome and Macedon within the ancient world, he always 
emphasized Roman superiority. In an attempt to diminish the achievement of Alexander’s 
conquests in Europe, Polybius states, “The rule of the Macedonians in Europe extended 
only from the lands bordering the Adriatic to the Danube, which would appear to be no 
more than a small fraction of the continent.”
35
 This argument proves unfair.  
Polybius in no way appreciates the immense difficulty involved in suppressing the 
various fierce and militaristic tribes of the Adriatic and Danube regions, which even 
Rome did not fully accomplish until the Augustan era. Furthermore, he is making a 
judgment based on his own knowledge of the world and not late fourth century B.C.E. 
Macedonian knowledge. For our purposes though, it is noteworthy that he diminishes 
Macedonian accomplishments in Europe.  
In stressing Rome’s greater conquests in Europe, Polybius is correct. The Roman 
conquests in the West dwarfed those of Alexander, who limited his incursions to the 
Balkans before moving east. By focusing on Europe, Polybius treated a major topic of his 
own history, namely documenting the meteoric rise to Rome to dominance in the 
Mediterranean world. He does this through highlighting the extent of Rome’s western 
conquests. Yet, by emphasizing Europe alone, Polybius unfairly minimized the overall 
territorial accomplishments of Alexander and placed the Romans in a more favorable 
light. 
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Immediately after the previous statement, in an attempt to further minimize the 
vast territorial expansions accomplished by the Macedonians under Alexander, Polybius 
adds, “Later, by overthrowing the Persian Empire, they [the Macedonians] also became 
the rulers of Asia; but although they were then regarded as having become the masters of 
a larger number of states and territories than any other people before them, they still left 
the greater part of the inhabited world in the hands of others.”
36
 This, statement equally 
corresponds with Polybius’ attempts to make the mid-republican Roman conquests look 
more geographically successful than Alexander’s, when in reality they were not.
37
 For it, 
too, attempts to limit the greatness of Alexander’s conquests in comparison with the 
Romans. 
Polybius, to his credit, at least admitted that Alexander possessed at best a 
marginal knowledge of the West in this period, stating that “they [the Macedonians] did 
not even once attempt to dispute the possessions of Sicily, Sardinia, or Africa, and the 
most warlike tribes of western Europe were, to speak the plain truth, unknown to them.”
38
 
While one might fault Polybius for judging Alexander by his own, later, understanding of 
the extent of the ancient world, it is more significant that Polybius here attempts to limit 
the expanse of Alexander’s conquests so as to elaborate his theme that the Romans were 
superior to the great Macedonian. 
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Ultimately, Polybius attempted to make the mid-republican Roman conquests 
look more geographically extensive than Alexander’s, when in reality they were not. 
Polybius’ argument proves deficient in several areas. Still, the fact that he made this 
argument is itself significant.
39
 To be clear, Polybius’ account of Alexander’s conquests 
is not overtly negative. The goal of this Polybian passage is not to criticize Alexander’s 
accomplishments as anything less than great; but in this passage Polybius yet again 
champions the Romans over Alexander, by focusing on Europe and limiting the scope of 
Alexander’s eastern conquests. Polybius’ conclusion to the section develops this theme 
even further. 
Polybius ends the thoughts he voices in praise of Rome’s great territorial 
achievements in comparison to those of Alexander by stating that “the Romans, on the 
other hand, have brought not just mere portions but almost the whole of the world under 
their rule, and have left an empire which far surpasses any that exists today or is likely to 
succeed it.”
40
 This final statement also deserves further discussion. As stressed above, 
Polybius shows a lack of a comprehension of the geographical scope of Alexander’s 
Empire. He also eagerly exaggerates the power of the Romans. Such a statement is 
clearly misleading and inaccurate. All the same, the deficiencies of Polybius’ arguments 
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are not the focus of this study.
41
 This final statement clearly articulates the Polybian 
theme of representing the Romans as superior to Alexander. That Polybius is making an 
unfair comparison is less important than the fact that Polybius made this comparison at 
all, as part of a longer argument. 
Such statements testify to Polybius’ agenda of claiming the Romans as superior to 
Alexander the Great. His championing of Roman conquests as the greatest of all can be 
explained by his determination to portray them as surpassing Alexander’s; we need to 
consider, too, the difficulties Polybius faced in order to address the challenge of 
diminishing Alexander’s conquests. By unfairly portraying the territorial scope of 
Alexander’s empire and exaggerating the Roman conquests during the period in which he 
wrote, Polybius was forced to argue around the undeniable extent of Alexander’s 
expansions. However, we must emphasize that Polybius did not deny the greatness of 
Alexander’s accomplishments, nor was he a harsh critic of Alexander. Polybius respected 
Alexander, and had a generally positive view of him. For Polybius, Alexander was still 
great; but Polybius thought that the Romans were greater, and formed his arguments to 
demonstrate and support this belief. As a result, as we have seen, he sometimes presented 
arguments that are untenable. 
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A Possible Comparison between Scipio Africanus and Alexander 
Another example of this Polybian theme occurs in his initial description of Scipio 
Africanus. Polybius declares that “he [Scipio] won greater fame than almost anyone 
before him.”
42
 That is certainly a bold statement, and Alexander immediately comes to 
mind as one of the men with whom Polybius is comparing Scipio. It is initially unclear 
from this statement whether Polybius thought Alexander was superior or inferior to 
Scipio. In as much as Alexander was more famous than Scipio, this statement alone 
cannot indicate Polybius’ opinion. However, Polybius’ description of Scipio’s early 
career, which appears to nearly parallel Alexander’s, does offer evidence that he viewed 
Scipio as superior in specific ways, as does his emphasis at the end of the section on 
Scipio’s superiority to generals who risked their lives in battle.  
Scipio’s first major battle was when he was seventeen or eighteen years old and in 
command of his father’s cavalry, where he conducted himself bravely, taking an 
important leadership role.
43
 Similarly, Alexander led the cavalry on the left flank at the 
battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C.E., serving under his father King Philip II when he was 
eighteen.
44
 Other sources, moreover, report rumors that Scipio from an early age 
connected himself with Alexander, not only failing to deny such rumors, but also even 
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making efforts to strengthen them.
45
 Indeed Scipio was one of the earlier Roman 
statesmen most closely associated with Alexander.
46
 
In this context, the final statement of this passage is worth discussing. In an 
attempt to display the caution and intelligence that Scipio had developed on the 
battlefield, Polybius states, “After this exploit [Scipio’s first battle] had won him a 
reputation for bravery, which all were bound to recognize, he was careful to refrain from 
exposing himself to danger when his country’s entire hopes rested upon his safety.”
47
 
Avoiding the dangers of leading from the front was not an uncommon phenomenon with 
Roman generals, who tended to lead their armies from behind the lines and did not 
normally fight hand-to-hand. A. D. Goldsworthy argues, “A commander who chose to 
fight throughout a battle automatically lost the ability to direct his reserves or indeed to 
issue any orders for the duration of the action. Given that reserves formed a high 
proportion of the total [Roman] army on most occasions, it was therefore rare for the 
Roman commander to lead from the front, after the manner of Alexander the Great.”
48
 
Although Goldsworthy describes the Roman military of the period directly following 
Polybius’ history, it would be difficult to argue that the Roman command structure and 
fighting procedures were entirely different from those of the Roman army of Polybius’ 
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period. This is not to imply that Roman commanders never fought among their soldiers. 
Similarly, it is not possible to prove that the majority of Roman generals of the mid-
Republic led from the front. One must also understand that without leading from the front 
Roman generals were still subject to danger and death. Yet, in the case of Scipio, 
Polybius illustrated that he did his best to avoid such dangers. 
Evidence suggests that Roman commanders were more inclined to lead either 
from the rear, (where the entire battle line could be viewed and the reserves could be 
positioned where they were most needed), or, close to but not on the front line, (where 
the commander still had the ability to control the placement of reserves but also was able 
to place himself at a critical position in the battle line).
49
 Although it was rare, Roman 
commanders did fight in the front ranks, often when the situation necessitated the 
commander’s physical presence, of which several examples are attested.
50
 On the other 
hand, as Goldsworthy rightly mentions, Alexander was known universally for his bravery 
and daring in combat, fighting at the head of his men, sharing in the risks of battle.
51
 In 
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The second half of Polybius’ statement about Rome’s hopes resting with Scipio’s 
safety is an exaggeration when regarding Scipio. Although important to the Roman war 
effort, he did not carry the entire burden of Roman success or failure. Livy’s account of 
Scipio’s own speech to a mutinous group of Roman soldiers outside of New Carthage, 
Spain in 206 B.C.E. emphasizes this very point. Livy records Scipio, in an attempt to 
dissuade the soldiers from mutiny against their country, stating,  
“I [Scipio] lay no stress upon my own name; I put it out of the question. 
Let it be supposed that I have not been injured by you in any respect 
beyond the ready credence of my death. What! If I were dead, was the 
state to expire with me? Was the empire of the Roman people to fall with 
me? Jupiter, most good and great, would not have permitted that the 
existence of the city, built under the auspices and sanction of the gods to 
last forever, should terminate with that of this frail and perishable body. 
The Roman people have survived those many and distinguished generals 
who were all cut off in one war; Flaminius, Paulus, Gracchus, Posthumius 
Albinus, Marcus Marcellus, Titus Quinctius Crispinus, Cneius Fulvius, my 
kinsmen the Scipios; and will survive a thousand others who may perish, 
some by the sword, others by disease; and would the Roman state have 




Livy here states that Scipio did not agree with the statement of Polybius that the fortune 
of Rome rested totally on his safety. The death of Scipio would not have doomed Rome. 
Yet, concerning Alexander, whose empire fractured immediately following his death, 
proving his indispensability, this is an example of what Polybius censures. Polybius 
disapproved a lack of caution in battle when the survival of the state was in jeopardy. 
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When Polybius adds that “such conduct is not the mark of a general who trusts to luck 
(tu/xv) [i.e. Alexander and his successors], but of one who possesses intelligence [i.e. 
Scipio],” he sends a clear message.
54
 We must emphasize that Polybius here refers to the 
luck of surviving in battle, not the luck of winning. In hand-to-hand combat, even a king 
could be killed. Polybius noted as much with his discussion of Ptolemy VI, who fell 
mortally wounded in battle.
55
  
Even though Polybius did not mention Alexander by name here, and may only 
have alluded to his actions, Alexander embodied these risky characteristics, and the 
potential connection should not be ignored. Scipio, whose career began much like 
Alexander’s, did not in the end foolishly risk his life in battle like the great Macedonian, 
or the Hellenistic kings who followed his example. At the least, this passage presents a 
Roman military virtue as superior to a Hellenic virtue.  
If this passage does allude to Alexander, one should not view it as an overtly 
negative criticism. Admittedly, this section praises the caution of Scipio on the 
battlefield; but elsewhere in his history, Polybius admires battlefield courage and faults 
those who lacked such bravery.
56
 The success of Alexander’s ability to command in the 
front ranks and his capability of leading his men to victory by sharing in their dangers 
was not lost on Polybius; he did praise Alexander’s accomplishments in his work and 
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indeed referred to him as superhuman.
57
 In fact, the contrast makes the example even 
more interesting in that it further demonstrates the lengths to which Polybius went in 
order to represent the Romans as surpassing the actions of Alexander. This possible 
influence on Polybius’ assessment of Alexander and its effect on his portrayal of Scipio 
is, to be fair, a matter of speculation; but it should not be overlooked, since the parallels 
between the young Scipio and Alexander are evident, because the passage champions 
Scipio’s caution in battle over the dangerous practices of fighting in the front lines made 
famous by Alexander, and because it corresponds with the greater Polybian theme of 
establishing the achievements of the Romans as greater than the actions of Alexander the 
Great. 
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The Argument for a Negative Polybian View of Alexander and Its Faults 
In Richard Billows’ article, “Polybius and Alexander Historiography,” he 
recognized the lack of scholarly work on Polybius’ opinion of Alexander the Great.
58
 His 
arguments deserve to be addressed in detail, since they are marked by some surprising 
shortcomings and oversights. He argues for the existence of “five basic themes 
concerning Alexander that interested Polybius.”
59
 According to Billows, those five 
themes are: Alexander’s destruction of Thebes, how he is compared with other kings, his 
character and generalship, the achievements of the Macedonians under Alexander, and 
Alexander’s military fortune passing to other generals.
60
 Billows uses these five 
categories of analysis in an attempt to establish Polybius’ resistance to and dislike of 
Alexander the Great. Billows pursued this line of argument by focusing on the passages 
found in Polybius’ history where he interpreted Polybian criticisms of Alexander. 
Although Billows’ argument does cover many important Alexander passages in Polybius’ 
work, it fails to appreciate fully the laudatory statements addressed at the beginning of 
this study, namely passages 8.10, 12.23, and 3.59. Many of Billows’ judgments on the 
evidence that he did discuss are misleading.  
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The negative Polybian view of Alexander that Billows’ article advances does not 
reflect the sentiments of all Polybius’ passages involving Alexander. Billows’ argument 
often misconstrues the language or judgment of a passage in order to support his 
argument that Polybius had a negative outlook on Alexander. In reality, Polybius’ 
opinion of Alexander is far more evenhanded, balancing between respect for his 
accomplishments and Polybius’ agenda of representing the Romans as greater than 
Alexander. This is not to imply that Polybius failed to criticize Alexander, as seen in his 
description of Alexander’s sack of the city of Thebes, discussed below. Polybius’ 
handling of Alexander in his work is more nuanced than Billows credits. Polybius can 
criticize Alexander in particular points in his history without expressing a generally 
negative opinion of him. Polybius himself tells us that, in his estimation, the human 
personality is complex, stating, “So true it is that there is something multiform in the 
nature not only of men's bodies, but of their minds, so that not merely in pursuits of a 
different class the same man has a talent for some and none for others, but often in the 
case of such pursuits as are similar the same man may be most intelligent and most dull, 
or most audacious and most cowardly. Nor is this a paradox, but a fact familiar to careful 
observers.”
61
 Polybius believed strongly that great men deserved both praise and blame.
62
 
His general tone toward Alexander, with the exception of a few statements discussed 
below, is positive. Under additional scrutiny, the negative picture painted by Billows 
appears less convincing. 
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Polybius’ Criticism of Alexander over the Destruction of Thebes 
Billows’ strongest evidence for Polybian criticism of Alexander involves 
Polybius’ discussion of the sack of the city of Thebes. In 38.2.14, Polybius refers to 
Alexander’s sack of the city of Thebes as “unjust and terrible (aÃdika kaiì deina\).” 
Polybius’ criticism proves partially unjustified, conforming as it does to the conventional 
Greek resentment toward Alexander over the sack of Thebes, which was still present 
when Polybius wrote.
63
  Ultimately, however, it is difficult to refute the negative view 
presented by Polybius in 38.2.13-4. However, it is also unnecessary. This one criticism of 
Alexander does not shape Polybius’ entire opinion of him, which, as I have demonstrated, 
is mostly positive. The criticism of Alexander over Thebes, on its own, cannot support 
Billows’ claim that Polybius harbored a collectively negative opinion of the great 
Macedonian.  
Additionally, although Polybius condemned Alexander’s sack of the city of 
Thebes, he does praise Alexander’s piety and his sparing of the Theban temples in 5.8-
11. This passage testifies to Polybius’ undeniable appreciation of Alexander, as it praises 
his sparing of the holy structures at Thebes. Section 5.8-11 indeed establishes a positive 
view of Alexander and is given insufficient appreciation in Billows’ article.  
According to Polybius in this passage, Philip V had captured the Aetolian city of 
Thermus. In retaliation for the Aetolian destruction of the holy sites of Dium and Dodana, 
he looted and sacked the holy places of Thermus. Philip’s actions horrify Polybius, who 
immediately highlights Alexander’s correct treatment of Thebes and the Persians: 
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And take Alexander. Though so indignant with the Thebans that he razed 
the city to the ground, yet he was so far from neglecting the reverence due 
to the gods when he captured the city, that he took the most anxious care 
that not even any unintentional offense should be committed against the 
temples and holy places in general. Even when he crossed to Asia to 
chastise the Persians for the outrages they had perpetrated against the 
Greeks, he strove to exact the punishment from men that their deeds 
deserved, but refrained from injuring anything consecrated to the gods, 





In this passage, Polybius praises Alexander’s holiness and respect for sacred sites. In 
addition, Polybius’s text characterizes Alexander as a righteous conqueror, punishing 
those who deserved punishment and sparing that which was sacred to the gods. Polybius 
voices complete agreement with this policy.  
Polybius highly praises Alexander’s piety in the face of the betrayal of the 
Thebans and the crimes of the Persians. The approval shown for Alexander by Polybius 
cannot be denied. The passage also represents Philip V as unworthy of his Macedonian 
predecessors for not following their examples in such a responsible manner: 
With these examples constantly present to his mind Philip should now 
have shown himself to be the true heir and successor of those princes 
[Philip II, Alexander, and Antigonus III], not inheriting so much their 
kingdom as their high principles and magnanimity. But, instead of this, 
though all through his life he was at great pains to prove that he was allied 
in blood to Alexander and Philip, he was not in the least anxious to show 
himself their emulator. Therefore since his practices were the reverse of 





Thus, Philip V failed morally where Alexander triumphed. The laudatory tone of this 
passage toward Alexander is unmistakable. In 5.8-11, Polybius does not portray 
Alexander’s sack of Thebes as an evil or cruel action like Philip V’s sack of Thermus. To 
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be fair, Thermus was more of a collection of temple complexes than a traditional Greek 
polis. Therefore, the issue that Polybius here emphasizes is proper treatment of temples. 
Nevertheless, Polybius’ favorable view of Alexander in this passage is undeniable. To 
exclude this passage when considering Polybius’ general opinion of Alexander is 
unreasonable if one seeks an accurate appraisal of how Polybius collectively viewed him. 
Alexander’s sparing of the Theban temples, in Polybius’ opinion, was a redeeming aspect 
of Alexander’s sack of Thebes. Even if Polybius had separated his judgments on 
Alexander’s actions against the temples of Thebes and those against Thebes itself, 
eliminating any contradiction on his part, he still provides an opinion of Alexander’s sack 
of Thebes that contains different degrees of criticism. We simply cannot view Polybius’ 
judgment of Alexander’s conduct in sacking Thebes as completely negative. 
Polybius may have condemned Alexander’s sack of the city of Thebes in 38.2.14. 
Yet, it is clear from this passage that Polybius considered Alexander a king of “high 
principles and magnanimity.” He respected Alexander’s responsible behavior and 
reverence for the temples of Thebes during the sack of the city. Hence, although Billows 
cites this passage, he does not give it the prominence that it deserves.
66
 In addition, it 
calls attention to another reason for Polybius’ respect for the actions of Alexander, his 
display of piety. 
Contrary to Billows’ opinion that Polybius did not portray Lyciscus as defending 
Alexander at 9.34, in fact Polybius does have Lyciscus defend Alexander’s sacking of 
Thebes by stating that “when he [Alexander] believed himself to be wronged, he 
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punished Thebes (a)dikeiÍsqai do/caj th\n Qhbai¿wn po/lin e)ko/lase).”67 Since he states 
that Alexander punished those who had wronged him, this does not represent Alexander 
as incorrect in his feelings. In addition, Lyciscus’ speech minimizes the negative act of 
sacking Thebes by listing the numerous benefits Alexander provided for Greece by his 
conquest of the Persians.
68
 It is true that Lyciscus does not directly justify Alexander’s 
sack of Thebes. However, Polybius’ argument indicates that, in his own view, 
Alexander’s benefits to Greece far outweighed the punishment of Thebes. Polybius 
sympathized with the opinion of Lyciscus.  
It is significant that Lyciscus’ speech follows that of Chlaeneas, who attacks the 
Macedonians for their oppression of Greece since Philip II.
69
 It is also significant that 
Chlaeneas was an Aetolian, since the Aetolians were bitter rivals of Polybius’ Achaeans, 
and that Lyciscus defends Antigonus III, whom Aratus, a hero in Polybius’ work, 
supported. In fact, Chlaeneas’ speech advocates war against the Achaeans!
70
 
Additionally, it is important that Polybius chose to include Lyciscus’ defense of 
Alexander. These details point to Polybius’ own support of Lyciscus’ defense of 
Alexander against the attacks of Chlaeneas.
71
 Billows presents this passage in his article 
as only attacking Alexander’s “atrocity” against Thebes.
72
 This is misleading. As we have 
seen, the passage has a more complex message.  
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Finally, even if we take Billows’ unfair example at face value, which we should 
not, Lyciscus’ failure to justify Alexander’s destruction of Thebes overtly in his speech, 
(although Lyciscus does argue that the benefits of Alexander’s great accomplishments far 
outweighed his problems with the Greeks), does not confirm that Polybius conveys 
disapproval of Alexander’s actions at Thebes in this passage.
73
 In fact, as stated above, it 
could be more easily argued that since Polybius has Lyciscus speak against the Aetolians, 
whom Polybius did not support, since Chlaeneas advocated war against the Achaeans, 
since Lyciscus’ speech came second as a rebuttal, since Lyciscus defended Antigonus, 
whom Aratus had supported, and since Lyciscus’ speech was over twice as long as that of 
Chlaeneas, that Polybius wished to emphasize and sympathized with the argument that he 
placed in Lyciscus’ mouth. In this scenario, Lyciscus is a creation of Polybius and he 
could characterize Lyciscus as he wished. Ultimately, the Spartans rejected Lyciscus’ 
speech and followed the Aetolians and Romans into war with the Achaeans and 
Macedonians. Polybius’ decision to assign Lyciscus a longer speech and the rebuttal 
becomes interesting and significant. 
Thus, just like Polybius’ overall opinion of Alexander, his account of Alexander’s 
sack of Thebes is more nuanced than Billows admits. For Polybius, Alexander’s actions 
against the town were cruel and terrible. However, as indicated by Lyciscus’ speech and 
in opposition to Billows’ opinion, Polybius knew that Alexander’s actions against the 
Thebans could be defended since Thebes had wronged Alexander.
74
 It is important that 
Polybius had someone defend this stance. In addition, Polybius praises Alexander’s piety 
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and reverence toward Thebes’ holy places. Polybius’ treatment of Alexander’s actions 
against the town and the temples is not necessarily contradictory. In 4.8.7-8, Polybius 
notes that Alexander’s actions were complex and warranted both blame and praise. 
Consequently, Billows exaggerates the general impact of the Theban sections on 
Polybius’ general opinion of Alexander. 
We cannot ignore either 38.2.13-4 or 5.10.6-7 when discussing Polybius’ view on 
the sack of Thebes. Nor does either passage allow for a clear representation of Polybius’ 
collective attitude toward Alexander on the issue of Thebes, let alone his general opinion 
of Alexander. Polybius’ accounts of the sack of Thebes may not support the argument 
that Polybius was sympathetic to Alexander’s actions, since 38.2.14 makes clear that he 
was not. Yet, Polybius was not critical of Alexander’s feelings of betrayal toward 
Thebes; through Lyciscus’ speech, he implies that some thought Alexander’s actions 
defendable. Ultimately, Polybius praised Alexander’s restraint in saving the Theban 
temples but faulted Alexander’s lack of restraint in sacking the city. Billows’ 
pronouncement that “for Polybius, Alexander’s treatment of Thebes was simply an 
unjustifiable atrocity” is too simplistic.
75
 We have shown the issue to be more 
complicated. Polybius thought the sack of the city was cruel. At the same time, though, 
he thought that the sparing of the temples was admirable behavior, something that 
Billows does not fully appreciate. The important observation to conclude from the 
Polybian discussions of Alexander’s sack of Thebes is that they do not establish 
Polybius’ overall view of Alexander as negative. Rather, they confirm that Polybius 
continued to be generally respectful of Alexander’s actions and accomplishments. 
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Polybius’ Comparison of Alexander with Other Kings 
Billows’ second theme is that of Polybius’ comparison between Alexander and 
other kings. Again, he cites four examples in an attempt to display a negative Polybian 
opinion of Alexander, stating that “of the four comparisons he [Polybius] draws, the 
contemporary kings come out ahead in two, and Alexander in the other two.”
76
 Billows 
emphasizes that Polybius differs from the majority of other ancient historians who treat 
Alexander because “the standard adulatory view of Alexander placed him far above 
contemporary rulers.”
77
 Billows is correct to argue that Alexander was often lauded 
above contemporary rulers. However, he is wrong in inferring that Polybius does not also 
share this view. As observed earlier in this study, where Billows’ assertions would have 
been correct is in characterizing Polybius’ accounts comparing the Romans to Alexander, 
since Polybius does consistently represent the Romans as superior to the great 
Macedonian. 
Firstly, Billows gives an incorrect reference for one of his examples. He states 
that Polybius compares Philip V unfavorably with Alexander in 38.2.13-4, when in fact 
this is one of Polybius’ discussions of Alexander’s sack of Thebes and in no way 
mentions Philip V. What Billows meant to cite was passage 18.3.2-5. Let us now turn to 
this passage. 
In the two pro-Alexander passages that Billows intended to cite (5.10.6-9, 18.3), 
Polybius yet again voices adulation for Alexander’s abilities. The other two passages 
cited by Billows require closer inspection. His first example, (4.23.9), treats the sack of 
Thebes, a topic addressed above. To be sure, Polybius favored sparing the Spartans in 
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220 B.C.E. because their marginal crimes did not merit the punishment of destruction. 
The situation of Sparta, moreover, did not parallel that of Thebes in 335 B.C.E. Yet, we 
should not consequently infer from this passage that Polybius favored Philip V’s 
“merciful treatment” over “the merciless treatment of Thebes by Alexander” as Billows 
puts it.
78
 Polybius’ text itself does not make this moralizing judgment. In fact, it limits the 
amount of praise due to Philip for his decision to spare Sparta because Polybius argued 
that this judgment was unlikely to have been his own.
79
 Even if we can detect an implicit 
criticism of Alexander here, in an unfavorable comparison with Philip in this section, 
then Billows provides only one indecisive example to support this argument (out of four). 
Additionally, this example comes from his analysis of Alexander’s treatment of Thebes, 
which he already discussed. Therefore, it adds little more to his hypothesis. 
Billows’ other example, 5.55.9-10, involves Polybius supposedly representing 
Antiochus III favorably at the expense of Alexander for allegedly conquering Media 
Atropatene. Billows contends that Polybius believed Alexander failed to do this, thereby 
“at least implying comparison favorable to Antiochus.”
80
 Certainly, Polybius had a 
purpose in mentioning Alexander next to Antiochus. Nevertheless, the idea that Polybius 
somehow characterizes Antiochus as surpassing Alexander in prestige is ill founded, as 
Polybius describes the weakness of Media Atropatene.
81
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Antiochus never “conquered” Media Atropatene, as Billows suggests; rather, he 
brought it under his hegemony without bloodshed and without difficulty.
82
 In this 
passage, Polybius’ point is not to argue that Alexander could not have accomplished this 
task where Antiochus did, as Billows argues; instead, he maintains that Alexander 
ignored this insignificant region and Antiochus did not. Billows attempts to make far too 
much of this passage. Alexander did not fail to conquer Media Atropatene, as Billows 
puts it, nor is Polybius implying as much in this section. Alexander never even made the 
attempt. Billow’s second theme, unlike the first, does more to promote Polybius’ respect 
for Alexander than it does to challenge it. 
The Character and Generalship of Alexander 
Billows’ third theme concerns Polybius’ opinion of Alexander’s character and 
generalship. He also presents this topic by giving four examples (5.10.6-9, 12.17-22, 
12.23, and 16.22a.5). The first three examples again are laudatory statements, where 
Polybius praises Alexander’s religious reverence, defends his command ability, and 
emphasizes his superhuman character. Billows only mentions this evidence, which is 
contradictory to his argument of Polybius’ negative view of Alexander, in passing. His 
article then concentrates solely on the final example, involving the Gazans’ resistance to 
the Persians, Alexander, and Antiochus III.
83
 Billows’ argument, even by his own 
acknowledgement, is only an interpretation of the possible implications of the text.
84
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In attempting to produce a series of Polybian criticisms of Alexander, Billows’ 
work focuses on the use of three words in the passage: safety (swthri¿a), impulse (o(rmh\), 
and force (bi¿a).85 Billows views Alexander as the destroyer of soteria, the harbinger of 
bia, and a man endowed with animal horme. We must emphasize again that this is 
Billows’ interpretation of the passage, not one suggested directly by Polybius. Billows’ 
argument may make some worthwhile observations, because Polybius does praise the 
Gazans and mention the enslavement of Tyre. Still, Billows’ overall argument is weak; in 
addition, he exaggerates its significance for the meaning of the passage and for Polybius’ 
general view of Alexander.  
It is important to note that a Persian and Arab force garrisoned Gaza. One can 
therefore argue that Gaza’s resistance to Alexander was more the decision of the Persian 
garrison than of the local population.
86
 However, Polybius’ failure to mention the Persian 
occupying force in Gaza, choosing instead to emphasize the determination of the Gazans 
alone, again illustrates his difference in attitude toward Alexander from the more 
traditional “Alexander historians.” His emphasis on the Gazans making efforts to defend 
their freedom from Alexander, as opposed to a Persian garrison defending Gaza from 
Alexander, demonstrates that Polybius intended Alexander’s actions to be interpreted 
differently from our other sources. Polybius admired cities that resisted the aggression of 
kings. Polybius’ approval of the resistance of the city of Abydus to Philip V is another 
example of this theme.
87
 At 16.22a.4-6, Polybius champions the actions of the Gazans 
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over the advances of Persia, Alexander, and Antiochus III. Yet, it is important not to lose 
sight of the fact that the passage does not focus on the actions of Alexander and that 
Billows’ arguments go too far.  
Billows’ article offers an interesting perspective on the passage. Perhaps if this 
passage was the only evidence we had left from Polybius’ commentary on Alexander 
there might be more reason to accept Billows’ perspective. Yet, the passage cannot bear 
the weight placed on it by Billows. Most of what Polybius says about Alexander is 
positive and hence contradicts this hypothesis. In fact, Billows himself acknowledges that 
the majority of the examples he cites in this third theme give a positive impression of 
Alexander, and the one possible exception that he champions is an interpretation relying 
on a reading of the text that cannot be proved to be correct. It is perfectly reasonable and 
appropriate to take this passage at face value as a military description.  It is true that 
Polybius represents Alexander as aggressive and as the enslaver of those who resist him. 
Nevertheless, this passage more likely expresses a moral judgment passed by Polybius on 
the correct way for small states to face the forceful pressures of stronger states, than it 
does a deliberate attack on Alexander. 
In spite of this, Billows’ work equates Polybius’ praise of the Gazans with direct 
criticism of Alexander.
88
 He then proceeds to assume that Polybius, in fact, agreed with 
Hegesias of Magnesia that this was another instance of ruthless and cruel conduct by 
Alexander.
89
 Thus, for Billows, Polybius characterized Alexander in this passage as the 
opposite of the Stoic ideal of a king and, in an indirect way, passed negative judgment 
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upon Alexander by praising the Gazans who resisted him in defense of their autonomy. 
As we have seen previously, Polybius’ text demonstrates that he was more than capable 
of openly alerting his reader when he condemned the actions of Alexander.
90
 Such open 
expression of negative opinion is also apparent in his commentary on Philip V, Antiochus 
III, the various Roman sycophants of the Greek world, and even the Romans themselves. 
With such a propensity toward openly voicing his own opinion throughout his history, 
why Polybius suddenly would choose this passage to mask his hidden opinion of 
Alexander as the negative of Stoic ideals further undercuts Billows’ argument. Polybius 
saw Alexander behaving aggressively in this instance. One should not disregard his 
praise of the Gazans’ resistance. Nevertheless, this passage is not a direct attack on 
Alexander. Billows’ argument, while it has a point, is speculative. 
Billows finishes his discussion by stating his personal opinion, “I venture to 
suggest therefore that Polybius does here, in praising the Gazans’ resistance to 
Alexander, depict Alexander in critical terms borrowed from the Stoic treatise on ideal 
kingship.”
91
 Billows’ suggestion no doubt appeals to those who wish to see Alexander 
painted in an unattractive light.
92
 However, since it is Billows’ own admitted 
interpretation, unsupported by dependable evidence, and contradicted by the frequency 
with which Polybius portrays Alexander positively, it does little to further the credibility 
of his hypothesis that Polybius’ depiction of Alexander is primarily negative. 
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Those Deemed as Praiseworthy for Greatness 
Billows’ fourth theme concerns “the allocation of credit for the achievements of 
the Macedonians under Alexander’s leadership.”
93
 He is correct to point out that most of 
the “Alexander historians” have a tendency to place most, if not full credit for 
Macedonian success in the East with Alexander.
94
 For Billows, “Polybius did not share 
that view.”
95
 He offers two passages (3.6.4-14, 22.18.10) to illustrate that Alexander 
merely made use of the preparations of his father, Philip II, to invade Persia. However, 
Billows’ assessment that, in Polybius’ opinion, Philip did all the preparation and 
planning, “while Alexander merely put Philip’s plans into effect,” is an exaggeration of 
what the text actually states.
96
 At 3.6.5, in an attempt to show that Alexander’s invasion 
did not cause the war with Persia, Polybius refers to “plans and preparations for which, in 
the case of the Persian war, had been made earlier, many (polla\) by Alexander and even 
some (o)li¿ga) by Philip during his life.” Certainly, Polybius is not guilty of giving all the 
credit to Alexander, nor should he have done so. However, he still gives more credit to 
Alexander than to Philip, contrary to Billows’ assertions. 
At 22.18.10, Polybius, in an attempt to equate the military situation of King 
Perseus with that of Alexander, states that “Philip [II], son of Amyntas, conceived and 
meant to carry out the war against Persia, but it was Alexander who put his decision into 
execution.” This passage again does not support Billows’ claim that Polybius had a 
negative opinion of Alexander. Here Polybius’ text makes no mention of physical 
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planning or preparation, emphasizing only Philip II’s words and Alexander’s actions. In 
fact, Polybius stresses that although Philip meant to carry out the war, Alexander actually 
executed it. Alexander ultimately capitalized on the idea and wish of his father, unlike 
Hannibal or Perseus, who failed in their attempts to carry out their fathers’ alleged 
conceptions. To be fair, Philip II was murdered and therefore could not invade Persia. All 
the same, this passage accords much praise and glory to Alexander. 
Billows’ third example is 8.10.7-11. We discussed this passage previously in this 
study. Billows’ article does not deny the laudatory and respectful tone displayed by 
Polybius. Instead, it focuses on Polybius’ attempt to share credit between Alexander and 
his subordinates. Again, though, Billows’ wording is misleading. Billows ignores the 
level of credit offered to Alexander by Polybius. Billows states, “In sum, for Polybius 
only a share of the credit for the Macedonian conquests belongs to Alexander, a greater 
share belonging to his generals and advisers.”
97
 Polybius assigned a large (mega/lhn) 
share to Alexander and no less (ou)k e)la/ttw) to his companions and therefore an equal 
level of credit to Alexander and his subordinates, not a greater share to one or the other. 
Billows’ own translation of the passage is: “no less credit.”
98
 No less does not mean 
greater. 
In an attempt to attribute a negative opinion of Alexander to Polybius in 8.10.8-9, 
Billows continues, “Alexander’s youth and inexperience are emphasized, as opposed to 
the extensive experience of his chief underlings while serving his father.”
99
 Polybius does 
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refer to Alexander’s youth, stating, “although he was young (kai¿per oÃnti ne/%).”100 
However, one should not view this as a negative. In addition, this section nowhere 
mentions Alexander’s “inexperience.”
101
 On the other hand, Polybius simply asserts that 
we should “give no less credit to his [Alexander’s] helpers and friends.”
102
 Polybius 
greatly praises Alexander’s companions but he does not mention their infinite wisdom 
and greater experience. The portrait of a young, ignorant Alexander deserving less credit 
than his subordinates of masterful quality and ability is a creation of Billows, not of 
Polybius. Polybius’ praise of the deserving subordinates of Alexander is more extensive 
than in what we find in many of the surviving “Alexander historians,” but not to the 
extent that Billows argues.  
Billows concludes his argument by stating, that “the view of the correct 
apportioning of credit for Macedonian successes espoused here by Polybius is far more 
plausible than the Alexandro-centric view offered by the ‘Alexander historians’ and 
uncritically endorsed by Tarn.”
103
 Perhaps, but this issue is more complicated than 
Billows suggests. Polybius wanted Alexander and the companions to share credit for 
good reason, but Billows exaggerates what Polybius says here.
104
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Did Polybius Believe that Alexander Owed Everything to Luck? Would that Matter? 
Billows’ final theme involves Polybius’ opinion of Alexander’s fortune. As an 
example, he cites Demetrius of Phalerum’s discussion of Fortune, as recorded by 
Polybius.
105
 Billows claims, “The clear implication of Polybius’ presentation of 
Demetrius’ views is that Alexander’s success was due primarily to the favour of 
Fortune.”
106
 This statement does not hold up to close examination as well when we 
scrutinize the passage thoroughly. Polybius quotes the relevant portion of Demetrius’ 
views as follows: 
“For if you consider not countless years or many generations, but only these 
fifty years before us, you will read in them the cruelty of Fortune. I ask you, 
do you think that fifty years ago either the Persians and the Persian king or 
the Macedonians and the king of Macedon, if some god had foretold the 
future to them, would ever have believed that at the time when we live, the 
very name of the Persians would have perished utterly — the Persians who 
were masters of almost the whole world — and that the Macedonians, 
whose name was formerly almost unknown, would now be the lords of it 
all? But nevertheless this Fortune, who never makes a compact with life, 
and who always defeats our reckoning by some novel stroke. She who ever 
demonstrates her power by foiling our expectations, now also, as it seems to 
me, makes it clear to all men, by endowing the Macedonians with the whole 
wealth of Persia, that she has but lent them these blessings until she decides 
to deal differently with them.” [Polybius continues] And this now happened 
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This discussion about the influence of Fortune on the Persians and Macedonians is less 
than clear and does not even explicitly mention Alexander.
108
 The “king of Macedon” 
referred to above is likely his father, Philip II.
109
 
What we must consider also is that the complete passage undeniably concerns 
King Perseus and his fall from power. The connection of Fortune to Perseus is a more 
pressing issue in this discussion than any commentary on Alexander. In any case, the 
passage refers to the Fortune of all of Macedon, not just of Alexander. We must therefore 
at least conclude that Polybius’ use of the passage shows that he believed that all of 
Macedon’s successes and failures were connected to Fortune. To focus only on 
Alexander here would be inappropriate. What is more, one cannot warrant Billows’ 
assumption that this statement is evidence for a “clear” Polybian connection between 
Alexander’s success and Fortune. There is no way to prove that this is Polybius’ clear 
purpose in including the Demetrius passage, especially since the passage obviously 
describes the Macedonians as a whole and is concerned with Perseus’ fall, not primarily 
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Alexander. In addition, a connection between Alexander and Fortune would not 
necessarily carry a negative connotation, serving as evidence that Polybius held a 
negative view of Alexander. 
 The connection of Alexander with Fortune is a common motif in ancient writing, 
and although Billows might have justification for including Polybius among the writers 
who depict Alexander in this way, the passage about Demetrius does not qualify as 
adequate evidence.
110
 It does not refer directly to Alexander and is concerned principally 
with Macedon’s fall from power under Philip V and Perseus. However, Alexander’s 
linkage to Fortune would not have lessened the respect and admiration felt by the 
ancients for the Macedonian and his accomplishments. S. P. Oakley points out that for a 
person living in the ancient world to say that Fortune favored someone was a great 
compliment.
111
 We must emphasize that Polybius was not necessarily different from 
other ancient writers. Associating Alexander with Fortune does not have to carry a 
negative implication.  
Connections made between Alexander’s personal success and the blessings 
bestowed on him by fortune might change from author to author, situation to situation. 
However, even if Billows’ account claims that “it is clear [for Polybius] that he 
[Alexander] benefited from a very great deal of plain old good luck,” he does not offer 
much support for this claim.
112
 His argument is unconvincing and does not establish 
Polybius’ view of Alexander as negative. 
                                                 
110
 For the most extensive ancient example still extant of connecting Alexander with Fortune, see 
Plutarch, On the Fortune of Alexander.  
 
111
 Oakley, Commentary III, 199. 
112




Polybius Compares Alexander Favorably to Other Dominant Figures in His Work 
An additional section of Polybius’ work that Billows does not emphasize is worth 
addressing: his account of the causes and beginning of Alexander’s war with Persia. As 
discussed previously, Polybius argues that past events involving Persia had a strong 
impact on the actions of Alexander. Former Greek military successes alerted Philip II to 
the opportunity awaiting the Macedonians in the Persian Empire.
113
 For Polybius, Philip 
II and Alexander used Persia’s invasions of Greece in 490 and 480 B.C.E. as a suitable 
pretext for war.
114
 It is interesting to note that Polybius does not brand Alexander as the 
aggressor against Persia. Admittedly, Polybius was not primarily dispensing moral 
judgments in this section. Rather, he was analytically discussing causation of wars for the 
benefit of future historians. Failing to blame Alexander for the war with Persia is not the 
same thing as praise of Alexander by Polybius. Still, it is significant that when given the 
opportunity to criticize Alexander on his reasons for invading Persia, Polybius did not 
decide to do so. Conversely, he did criticize Hannibal’s actions in the Second Punic War, 
Antiochus’ actions in the Syrian War, and later, Perseus’ actions in the Third Macedonian 
War.
115
 These statements elsewhere further underline that Polybius is not criticizing 
Alexander here. Such evidence refutes Billow’s assertion that Polybius had a thoroughly 
negative opinion of Alexander. This section of Polybius’ work warrants discussion in this 
context because it furnishes another example establishing Polybius’ lack of hostility 
toward Alexander. Instead of noting Alexander’s ambition for glory, desire for 
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bloodshed, want of fortune, or unstoppable aggression as the causes for war, Polybius 
adopts the pro-Macedonian reasoning to justify the invasion, namely the violent actions 
of Persia against Greece. It is necessary to address the passage closely, focusing on where 
Polybius records his thoughts on the causes, pretexts, and beginnings of wars: 
Some of those authors who have dealt with Hannibal and his times, 
wishing to indicate the causes that led to the above war between Rome and 
Carthage [the Second Punic War], allege as its first cause the siege of 
Saguntum by the Carthaginians and as its second their crossing, contrary 
to treaty, the river whose native name is the Iber [the modern day 
Ebro]. I should agree in stating that these were the beginnings of the war, 
but I can by no means allow that they were its causes, unless we call 
Alexander's crossing to Asia the cause of his war against Persia and 
Antiochus' landing at Demetrias the cause of his war against Rome, 




Here Polybius indicates that he did not feel that Alexander’s invasion of Persia was the 
cause of the war. Polybius continues: 
For who could consider these to be causes of wars, plans and preparations 
for which, in the case of the Persian war, had been made earlier, many by 
Alexander and even some by Philip during his life, and in the case of the 
war against Rome by the Aetolians long before Antiochus arrived? These 
are pronouncements of men [i.e. the historians that Polybius is scolding] 
who are unable to see the great and essential distinction between a 
beginning and a cause or purpose, these being the first origin of all, and 
the beginning coming last. By the beginning of something I mean the first 
attempt to execute and put in action plans on which we have decided, by 




Polybius’ argument thus demonstrates the general short sightedness and confusion of 
other historians in their discussions of the beginnings and causes of wars. Polybius 
desired to make clear that every conflict has a cause, pretext, and beginning, in that order. 
In his deliberations on Alexander’s war with Persia, Polybius states: 
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The nature of these [the cause, pretext, and beginning] is evident from the 
instances adduced above; it is easy for anyone to see the real causes and 
origin of the war against Persia. The first [cause] was the retreat of the 
Greeks under Xenophon from the upper Satrapies, in which, though they 
traversed the whole of Asia, a hostile country, none of the barbarians 
ventured to face them. The second [cause] was the crossing of Agesilaus, 
King of Sparta, to Asia, where he found no opposition of any moment to 
his projects, and was only compelled to return without effecting anything 
owing to the disturbances in Greece. From both of these facts Philip 
perceived and reckoned on the cowardice and indolence of the Persians as 
compared with the military efficiency of himself and his Macedonians, and 
further fixing his eyes on the splendor of the great prize which the war 
promised, he lost no time, once he had secured the avowed good-will of 
the Greeks, but seizing on the pretext that it was his urgent duty to take 
vengeance on the Persians for their injurious treatment of the Greeks, he 
bestirred himself and decided to go to war, beginning to make every 




Philip II recognized the successes of Xenophon and Agesilaus as attractive causes for 
war. These military actions had left Persia in a diminished state of perceived power and 
diminished the “uncertainty principle” restricting Macedonian action against Persia.
119
 
The conquests of Philip had increased the power of Macedon and numerous internal 
conflicts had weakened the Persian Empire.
120
 Thus, a “power transition crisis” had 
emerged.
121
 In political-science terminology, what was once a system of unipolarity 
under Persia, i.e. an international system where hegemony is dominated by one 
superpower, was now replaced by a system of bi-polarity, i.e. the shared dominance of 
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hegemony by two rival powers, between Persia and Macedon.
122
 Philip saw an 
opportunity to wage a “hegemonic war” against Persia to establish Macedon as the new 
leader of a system of unipolarity.
123
 With his causes established, Philip desired a justified 
pretext for war. This came in the form of the Greeks’ desire to avenge the invasions of 
490 and 480 B.C.E. by the Persians.
124
  
Polybius concludes, “We must therefore look on the first considerations I have 
mentioned [i.e. the actions of Xenophon and Agesilaus] as the causes of the war against 
Persia, the second [avenging the Persian invasions of Greece] as its pretext, and 
Alexander's crossing to Asia as its beginning.”
125
 Ultimately, Philip was the cause of the 
war and Alexander was the instrument through which the war began. Whatever judgment 
Polybius’ argument makes here, it does not view Alexander negatively. In fact, Polybius’ 
lack of criticism of Alexander when compared to the extent to which he criticized 
Hannibal, Antiochus, and Perseus is significant. 
We must mention again that Polybius’ text attempts to teach future historians a 
lesson in the proper manner by which to determine causation more than it passes moral 
judgments. However, Polybius’ lack of hostility toward the actions of Philip and 
Alexander is apparent. If Polybius had a generally negative attitude toward Alexander, as 
Billows argues, then it seems likely that Polybius would have voiced this negative 
opinion in this part of his history. Polybius could have characterized Alexander as a cruel 
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aggressor. Although this section of Polybius’ text is more analytical than moralizing, the 
noticeable distinction made by Polybius between the example of Philip and Alexander 
and the example of Hamilcar and Hannibal is important.
126
 Polybius portrays Hannibal’s 
war against Rome as based first on his anger.
127
 Furthermore, Polybius juxtaposes the hot 
emotion fueling the Hannibalic War against the cool reasoning behind Alexander’s 
expedition.
128
 He then describes Hannibal as the vessel and continuation of his father’s 
hatred.
129
 In 3.15, Polybius also represents Hannibal as the model of a bad statesman.
130
 
Finally, Polybius describes Hannibal, who in his opinion had a justifiable pretext for war 
against Rome in the illegal confiscation of Sardinia by the Romans, as “in a mood of 
unreasoning and violent anger,” and as “obsessed by passion” after failing to advance this 
justified point.
131
 Polybius’ opinion implies that Hannibal lost all moral superiority in the 
conflict by creating a false pretext for war with Rome over Saguntum. Polybius states 




Polybius’ discussion of the causes and pretext of Hannibal’s war with Rome 
stands in contrast to what he recorded about Alexander’s war with Persia. It would be 
short sided to interpret it as merely factual analysis on the part of Polybius, devoid of any 
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deeper meaning. The negative moral judgments passed by Polybius on Hannibal, and the 
lack thereof passed on Alexander, should not be dismissed as inconsequential. Nor should 
we overlook Polybius’ intentional pairing of Alexander’s correctly executed war with the 
wars incorrectly executed by Hannibal and Antiochus III.  
Although Polybius faults Antiochus III for waging war because of the misguided 
anger of the Aetolians, and Hannibal for prematurely launching the Second Punic War 
through hatred and foolishness, Polybius does not criticize Alexander’s resolution to 
invade Persia.
133
 He also praises Alexander’s success.
134
 Additionally, Polybius here 
embraces the pro-Macedonian justification for war and appears unwilling to disparage 
Alexander for committing a war out of personal ambition, greed, or aggression. Although 
Polybius pairs Alexander’s success with Hannibal’s and Antiochus’ failures, this passage 
should not be taken as strong praise for Alexander. Yet, it still qualifies as further 
evidence disproving Billows’ argument that Polybius considered Alexander in mostly 
negative terms. 
Final Thoughts on the Shortcomings of the Claim that Polybius Viewed Alexander 
Negatively 
 Billows’ article raises some interesting points about Polybius’ assessments of 
Alexander. Nevertheless, his methods and conclusions too often misrepresent Polybius’ 
text. Billows does succeed in showing that Polybius wrote about Alexander in a different 
way from that adopted by the more traditional sources, the “Alexander historians.” 
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Billows is also correct to point out that the apologetic tone found in many of the 
“Alexander historians” is mostly, if not completely, missing from Polybius’ work. 
However, where Billows’ argument ultimately fails is in its efforts to prove that Polybius 
was hostile to Alexander. Other than Polybius’ discussions of Alexander’s sacking of the 
city of Thebes, the text does not validate this claim. In addition, Polybius’ passages on 
Thebes are more nuanced than Billows contends, and they are insufficient evidence for 
determining Polybius’ general opinion toward Alexander.  
Billows’ article does not pay enough attention to evidence contradictory to his 
arguments. Nor does he sufficiently consider Polybius’ respect for Alexander the 
Great.
135
 Billows does bring more attention to Alexander’s impact on Polybius.
136
 Yet, he 
also reaches conclusions by exaggerating some of Polybius’ views. Billows does not 
discuss the topic in adequate detail. It is a goal of this present study to do what Billows 
did not manage to accomplish, by looking at evidence that he neglected or misconstrued.   
There can be no denying that Polybius respected the accomplishments and 
abilities of Alexander. It is also clear that Polybius did not refuse to criticize Alexander 
when he felt that it was necessary. In comparing what Polybius says about the Romans to 
what he says about Alexander, we see that Polybius made certain criticisms of the 
Macedonian king. However, offering criticism did not render Polybius’ collective opinion 
of Alexander as negative, despite Billows’ argument. What is important to remember is 
that these criticisms do not challenge the greatness of Alexander; instead they serve the 
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purpose of portraying Alexander and his accomplishments as more human, and therefore, 
more humanly obtainable. Ultimately, Polybius saw Rome as the true successor and rival 
of Alexander. Polybius believed that Alexander was indeed great; however, he portrays 





How Roman Arms Came to Conquer the Successors of Alexander 
Now it is time to turn to a final passage by Polybius, Polybius’ digression on the 
Macedonian phalanx immediately following his account of the Roman victory at 
Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C.E. and his arguments about its shortcomings when compared 
to the Roman manipular legion. Polybius’ effort to portray Roman accomplishments as 
superior to Macedonian accomplishments, noted previously in the passages about 
Polybius’ discussion of the scope of Roman conquest and Polybius’ opinion of Scipio’s 
caution in battle, will be further analyzed in this section. This passage also attests to the 
influence of the reputation of Alexander on Polybius’ writings. It warrants emphasis, 
however, that Polybius here discusses the Macedonians of the late third and early second 
centuries B.C.E., not those of Alexander’s period per se.  
In this account, Polybius asserts that the Greeks of his period had not 
disassociated the successes and methods of Philip II’s and Alexander’s Macedonian 
phalanx armies from those of Philip V, Antiochus III, and Perseus. This is even though 
the tactics, formations, and composition of the Macedonian army had changed over the 






 Polybius’ digression illustrates that he did not make this 
connection. Polybius saw the Macedonian armies of his period as nearly identical to those 
of Philip II and Alexander.
138
 For this reason, he offered misleading arguments, only a 
few of which we will discuss, since they are not the focus of this study. Yet, Polybius’ 
implied association of Alexander’s reputation with that of the Macedonian armies, which 
the Romans defeated, enabled him to strengthen his theme of Roman superiority to the 
great king. 
The high reputation of the military might of the Macedonian phalanx, which 
Philip II and Alexander built, still was associated with the Macedonian armies of 
Polybius’ period. Relating Alexander to his successors would not have been difficult for 
Polybius’ audience. Clearly, Greeks of Polybius’ time, like Polybius himself, were likely 
to have identified the Macedonian phalanx of the mid-second century B.C.E. with that of 
the late-fourth century B.C.E. Such identification would have helped to provoke general 
Greek shock at Rome’s domination of Macedon, as described by Polybius at the end of 
his digression.
139
 By asserting the superiority of the Roman army over the army built by 
Philip II and taken to the ends of the earth by Alexander, Polybius established his theme 
that Roman greatness surpassed that of Alexander. Polybius did not take this theme to the 
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same extent as Livy did, since Livy created a hypothetical faceoff between the Romans 
and Alexander. However, by arguing that the Roman army was better than the 
Macedonian army, which Alexander had made famous and which was still associated 
with him, Polybius engaged in a comparison that we must not overlook. Alexander is not 
Polybius’ direct subject, but the association of the great king with the topic under 
discussion cannot be denied. 
How Much More Successful Was the Roman Legion than the Macedonian Phalanx? 
To begin his digression, in an attempt to illustrate the successes of the two 
military techniques, Polybius states, “The Macedonian formation was proved by 
operational experience to be superior to the others which were in use in Asia and Greece, 
while the Roman system overcame those employed in Africa and among all the peoples 
of Western Europe.”
140
 Polybius thus clearly described the two dominant military 
systems of the ancient Mediterranean world and noted their geographic spheres of 
original impact and their relative geographical separation. In the digression, Polybius 
expresses that he wished “to study the differences between them [the manipular legion 
and the pikeman phalanx], and to discover the reason why on the battlefield the Romans 
have always proved the victors.”
141
 Firstly, Polybius’ statement about Roman military 
success is not accurate. He completely disregards the defeats of the Romans at the hands 
of the Macedonian phalanx in 198 B.C.E. at Atrax and the campaign of King Pyrrhus of 
Epirus, who invaded Italy and won the battles of Heraclea in 280 and Asculum in 279 
B.C.E. These last two battles have been immortalized as “Pyrrhic” victories because 
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Pyrrhus gained a marginal victory at too high a cost. However, we must note that in both 
instances the Romans lost far more men than did Pyrrhus, nearly twice as many on both 
occasions.
142
 Carrying the field and losing only half the number of men as one’s enemy 
can only be considered a victory, no matter what label with which one tries to brand it, to 
soften the blow.  
Polybius is also incorrect when he states, “But even with the help of these 
methods he [Pyrrhus] did not succeed in winning a victory, and the outcome of all his 
battles was somewhat indecisive.”
143
 As previously discussed, this is a deceptive 
statement. F. W. Walbank remarks that Polybius is “unjust to Pyrrhus.”
144
 Pyrrhus won 
two legitimate victories against the Romans at Heraclea and Asculum.
145
 Although 
Roman propaganda made a solid effort to deny Pyrrhus his victory, they misrepresented 
his accomplishments.
146
 Polybius took what others might label as “Pyrrhic” victories and 
further distorted them into indecisive engagements. Perhaps Polybius equated the overall 
failure of Pyrrhus’ invasion with a lack of individual successes on the battlefield. The 
battles of Heraclea and Asculum thus were indecisive in winning Pyrrhus the war. 
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However, to deny Pyrrhus any victory over the Romans is to deny facts reported by 
reliable historians. Here we encounter Polybius’ distortion of the past to fit his message 
for the future, namely that Rome and the Roman army were far superior militarily to all 
others; and, in particular, superior to a relative of Alexander the Great.
147
 
The Best Soldiers versus the Best Formation 
Outside of this digression, it is interesting that Polybius considered the 
Macedonians to be the best and most ferocious soldiers in the entire world. He displayed 
the Romans as good soldiers but steady and calm.
148
 Conversely, according to Polybius, 
the Macedonians were hardy, well disciplined, adaptable to land or water, and went 
“joying in war as if it were a feast.”
149
 Yet, A. M. Eckstein has established that the 
Romans were not otherwise viewed as fearless fighting machines, undefeatable in 
battle.
150




Even though Polybius had a higher opinion of the average Macedonian soldier 
than of his Roman counterpart, this opinion does not appear to influence his comparison 
between the Macedonian phalanx versus the Roman manipular legion. Apparently, he did 
not feel that the best soldiers in the world necessarily created the greatest battle formation 
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in the world. Here again, Polybius’ text represents the Romans as superior to the 
Macedonians. 
Why the Greeks Were Shocked after Rome’s Domination of Macedon 
The domination of the Romans over the various Greek states and Hellenistic kings 
in the second century B.C.E. came as quite a shock to much of the Hellenized east. In 
confirmation of this near universal astonishment, Polybius finished his digression by 
stating, “I have felt obligated to deal with this subject at some length, because so many 
Greeks on those occasions when the Macedonians suffered defeat [most noticeably at 
Cynoscephalae, Magnesia, and Pydna] regarded such an event as almost incredible, and 
many will still be at a loss to understand why and how the phalanx proves inferior by 
comparison with the Roman method of arming their troops.”
152
 The purpose that he states 
for writing his digression is intriguing when we consider Alexander and his 
accomplishments.  
There was confusion in the minds of Polybius’ Greek audience, who knew well 
both the glory won in battle by the Macedonians and their military dominance under 
Alexander the Great. The Macedonians had defeated and suppressed many of the Greek 
states since Philip II rose to power in the mid-fourth century B.C.E. The Greeks were 
well acquainted with the military efficiency of the Macedonian phalanx. The reverses 
suffered by Macedonian armies under Philip V, Antiochus III, and Perseus had many in 
the Hellenistic world at a loss for words. To them the Macedonians were still the greatest 
soldiers in the world, as Polybius himself attests.
153
 Through his first hand encounters 
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with the Romans, Polybius came to conclude that the Romans ultimately were militarily 
superior, even surpassing the accomplishments of Alexander. However, the majority of 
the Greeks did not share this opinion, as indicated by Polybius at the end of his 
digression.
154
 The knowledge of the great armies of Philip II and Alexander was still 
widespread, and the perceived strength of the armies of Philip V, Antiochus III, and 
Perseus still fresh in Greek minds.  
By the second century B.C.E., Macedonian power had waned considerably, as a 
result of Alexander’s death and the fracturing of his massive empire.
155
 Antigonus II, 
Philip V, and Antiochus III made territorial resurgences, often against other Hellenic 
states.
156
 However, no man came close to regaining Alexander’s entire empire and little 
land, outside of that originally conquered by Alexander, was brought under the influence 
of the Hellenic successor states in the one hundred fifty years following his death. The 
prestige of Alexander and the mighty world he had once conquered at the tip of the 
sarissa would not have been lost on Polybius’ second century B.C.E. Greek audience.
157
 
Livy may also hint at this idea that Macedonia and the Greek world were desperately 
hanging on to their waning prestige in the face of their lost military dominance in his 
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account of a speech given by T. Quinctius Flamininus before the battle of Cynoscephalae 
in 197 B.C.E. Livy reports:  
“They [the Romans] were going to fight the same Macedonians whom 
they had fought in the passes of Epirus, fenced, as they were, with 
mountains and rivers, and whom, after conquering the natural difficulties 
of the ground, they had dislodged and vanquished; the same, whom they 
had before defeated under the command of Publius Sulpicius, when they 
opposed their passage to Eordaea. That the kingdom of Macedonia had 
been hitherto supported by its reputation, not by real strength; and that 




Although we should mention that Livy benefited from an additional century and a half of 
hindsight, as discussed previously, Polybius and especially his Greek audience did not 
distinctly perceive a large separation between the Macedonians of Alexander’s period 
and those of Philip V’s or Perseus’ period. For Polybius and his fellow Greeks, the 
Roman domination of the Macedonians was significant and marked a clear transition 
from the power built by Alexander to the rising power that Rome was building.  
 One cannot emphasize enough the impact that Alexander had on the minds of 
the Hellenic world. He continued to influence the Hellenic conceptualization of their 
defeat at the hands of the Romans and their shattered military position in the second 
century B.C.E. Polybius’ digression indirectly speaks to this point. Polybius, a patriotic 
Achaean and at the same time a friend and supporter of Rome, clearly felt a need not only 
to address the Greek past but also to elucidate the Roman future.
159
 There was a need to 
explain why the Hellenic world had been defeated and how Roman arms proved superior, 
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even over the successors of Alexander. Ultimately, in claiming the superiority of Roman 
military ability and success in his work, Polybius’ greatest obstacle was Alexander the 
Great and his accomplishments.  
 The fact that Polybius felt a pressing need to explain to the befuddled 
Macedonians and Greeks how the Romans bested them in war demonstrates the serious 
influence that Alexander left on the ancient world. As observed previously, when 
Polybius represented Rome as superior to Alexander, he was forced to make unfair 
arguments; whether or not this happened intentionally is open to debate. Yet, what we 
can understand through Polybius’ history is the competition, in both accomplishment and 
ability, between the reputation of Alexander and the reputation of the Romans. As we 
shall see, by the time of Livy’s history, written in the late first century B.C.E., this issue 
had continued to loom large. 
Final Thoughts on the Impact of Alexander on Polybius’ Work 
 This study demonstrates that, although Polybius criticized Alexander where he 
thought the great king deserved such criticism, his overall opinion of Alexander was 
positive and respectful. Billows’ article argues that Polybius was unlike the traditional 
“Alexander historians,” who did little but praise the Macedonian, which is correct. 
However, Billows’ opinion goes too far in arguing that Polybius’ view of Alexander was 
primarily negative.  
 Although we have shown their assessments of Alexander to be more complex 
than Billows suggests, the passages describing Alexander’s sack of Thebes provide 
Billows’ strongest evidence. Even though Polybius respected Alexander’s restraint 




Nevertheless, we should remember that, for Polybius, proper historiography required that 
any historical figure receive both praise and blame depending on his various deeds and 
actions.
160
 Thus, the account of Thebes criticizing Alexander does not signify that 
Polybius generally held a negative opinion of Alexander. As this study demonstrates, 
Polybius’ overall view of Alexander, although nuanced, is positive. In particular, he 
respected Alexander’s piety, his military abilities, and the vastness of his 
accomplishments.  
 Billows is correct to observe that Polybius’ discussions of Alexander prove 
more complex than those by many of the more traditional “Alexander historians.” Still, 
for Polybius, Alexander was an impressive character, who could serve as a positive 
example for the Romans and deserved praise. Although not a dominant figure in 
Polybius’ text itself, Alexander is an important topic in Polybius’ work. When Polybius 
looked to what was for him the distant past, he considered Alexander the most significant 
person worth mentioning. This in itself is interesting and important.  
 In Polybius’ work though, Alexander is not the most important subject of 
interest in the recent past or present. For Polybius, the Romans occupy this role.  Through 
his history, we find a Greek attesting to the superiority of Rome and Roman 
accomplishments over even those of Alexander. This theme leads to unfair and 
misleading arguments, a few of which this study addresses. Polybius’ text sometimes 
deals with Alexander unjustly. However, the respect for Alexander remains. In fact, the 
respect that Polybius held for the achievements of Alexander, which he expresses several 
times in his work, makes it clear how highly he regarded the Romans, who he portrays as 
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superior. Ultimately, Polybius calls Alexander’s supreme greatness into question, and he 
elevates the Romans and their achievements over the great Macedonian. What one must 
understand is that this is not out of anger or dislike. Polybius still thought Alexander was 





Livy Pushes the Argument Further 
Polybius explained how the Roman legion was superior to the Macedonian 
phalanx, but Livy took matters further by discussing how Alexander the Great would 
have failed had he attempted to invade Italy. In fact, Livy’s engagement with this topic, 
and his efforts to portray Alexander as great but the Romans as greater are far more 
detailed and thorough than those of Polybius. In his digression on Alexander’s 
hypothetical invasion of Italy found in Book 9, Livy most clearly depicts his theme of 
representing the Romans as superior to Alexander.
161
 This digression occurs in the 
middle of Livy’s narrative of the Second Samnite War, following the Roman humiliation 
at the Caudine Forks.  
As discussed in this section, there are numerous possible interpretations of this 
digression. Nevertheless, we should not consider the digression without also discussing 
the other surviving passages in Livy’s work where Alexander appears or where Livy 
refers to him indirectly. Once we appreciate all the references to Alexander found in 
Livy’s writing, the objective of Livy’s digression takes on new meaning. We thus can 
establish how important the image of Alexander was to Livy throughout his work.  
Livy utilized this image both to establish his personal opinion of Alexander and to 
help articulate his own opinion of his own people. This study will maintain that Livy’s 
employment of Alexander and his image has a significant influence on Livy’s larger 
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narrative. The various Alexander passages, when brought together, encourage a new 
understanding and appreciation for both Livy’s history and the Roman fascination with 
the great Macedonian. Although the digression suggests several Livian objectives, its 
fundamental purpose is to assert Roman superiority, over even Alexander. In this sense, 
Livy expanded the model established by Polybius. In fact, not only is this the 
fundamental purpose of the digression, but this interpretation of the subject also has 
major ramifications for the larger narrative once all the Alexander passages are 
considered together, whatever the problematic aspects of analysis.
162
 
To understand this digression and the other Alexander passages better, we briefly 
must discuss the author himself. Livy’s work offers a viewpoint much different from that 
of Polybius. Livy may have shared Polybius’ opinion on the differences between 
Alexander and Rome. However, Livy’s differences with Polybius, both in background 
and in writing, are striking.  
Livy was born in Patavium (modern day Padua) in roughly 59 B.C.E.; but much 
of his early life is unknown.
163
 It is worth noting that Livy was not able to study in the 
schools of Greece, like many well-to-do Roman youths, and there are no records of him 
holding any political office throughout his life.
164
 He never served the Roman state in an 
official political or military capacity. Although his history features numerous accounts of 
Rome’s great wars, Livy never participated in or even saw a battle. Ultimately, Livy was 
                                                 
162
 Throughout Livy’s work, his desire to moralize led him to make factual changes and 
exaggerations to his history. See S. P. Oakley, A Commentary on Livy Books XI-X, Vol. 1, Introduction and 
Book VI (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 115. 
163
 John Briscoe, “Livy,” in The Oxford Companion to Classical Civilization, ed. Simon 
Hornblower and Anthony Spawforth (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 425. 
164
 R. M. Ogilvie, Livy: Rome and Italy, Books VI-X of the History of Rome from its Foundation, 




what Polybius criticized as an “armchair historian.”
165
 In addition, he often wrote history 
in the style of an orator.
166
 Livy preferred a library to a battlefield and, in fact, followed 
Polybius’ The Histories closely in his books 35-45.
167
  
An Example of How Livy’s Military Accounts Can Prove Unreliable 
Livy’s lack of firsthand experience is often apparent from his accounts of battles. 
We should view Livy’s discussions of strategy and battlefield tactics with caution. For 
example, in his recording of the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C.E., Livy’s text 
depicts Philip V as ordering his phalanx “after laying aside their spears, whose length 
was a hindrance, to make use of their swords (hastis positis, quarum longitudo 
impedimento erat, gladiis rem gerere iubet).”
168
 Here Livy has confused the battlefield 
narrative. At Cynoscephalae, Philip moved to the phalanx on his right wing, which was at 
the top of a ridge, and with the Romans steadily advancing he would have ordered his 
men to bring down their spears for action, not to discard them for their swords because 
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their pikes were a hindrance.
169
 This is a critical difference. Livy, the “armchair 
historian,” demonstrates his lack of battlefield knowledge in this instance.  
As the Roman legions steadily approached, Philip quickly reorganized his lines by 
halving their front and doubling their depth.
170
 Philip was preparing an impenetrable front 
of spear points, not a mass of swordsmen.
171
 Such an order by Philip as Livy records 
would have been ridiculous and immediately disastrous. Livy is guilty of making a 
crucial mistake by misunderstanding the basic processes of phalanx warfare. Livy’s lack 
of military knowledge resurfaces in his digression and caused him to make critical errors 
when he discussed Alexander’s hypothetical invasion of Italy.
172
  
Livy the Historian 
Instead of holding offices or joining the military, Livy devoted his attention to 
writing his vast universal history of the rise of Rome.
173
 His work was to encompass the 
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history of Rome from its founding to the age of Augustus.
174
 Of the original 142 books, 
only books 1-10 and 21-45 survive.
175
 The remainder of Livy’s history, except the no 
longer extant books 136 and 137, is preserved only in the brief excerpts of the Periochae 
(summaries).
176
 Livy was free to compose such a massive work due to his patronage by 
Augustus. Livy came from a prestigious family and rubbed elbows with many of Rome’s 
aristocracy, including the future emperor, Claudius, whom he tutored.
177
 Although Livy 
knew the emperor Augustus, there is little evidence that the two were on friendly terms, 
although that did not keep Augustus and his court from offering him their patronage.
178
 
R. M. Ogilvie states that “the difference between Livy and the others [other 
ancient writers] is that his philosophical detachment enabled him to see history in terms 
of human characters and representative individuals rather than of partisan politics.”
179
 
Livy followed in the philosophical tracts of Thucydides, arguing that human nature was 
constant and therefore predictable. He utilized this philosophical framework throughout 
his work.
180
 Livy was also a traditionalist. He was of the opinion that the ancients, in his 
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case the early Romans, were morally superior to their descendants. Livy had a respect 
and longing for the traditions of the past that is clearly visible in his text. G. Miles argues, 
“Livy contrasts the vitality of early Rome with the degenerate, self-destructive Rome of 
his own age, and he ascribes that contrast to the influences of wealth and a human 
propensity to succumb to its attractions.”
181
 Through his study of history, Livy thought 
that “things had got worse and worse.”
182
 J. Briscoe states that Livy believed that “a 
serious moral decline had taken place by his own time, and appears to have lacked 
confidence that Augustus could reverse it.”
183
 However, Ogilvie argues that Livy did 
believe that redemption for Rome was possible in the future.
184
 This positive evaluation 




Livy’s digression consistently voices skepticism about Alexander’s military 
prospects in Italy. The question is: why? However, to answer this question we must first 
establish Livy’s motives behind the inclusion of this digression in his history. Livy 
certainly respected Alexander’s military ability, which is evident in several passages 
where he directly praises or uses sources that praise Alexander’s abilities and 
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accomplishments, namely 8.3.7, 9.16.12-9, 9.17.2, 35.14.5-12, 45.7.3, and 45.9.5-7, all of 
which are discussed in greater detail below. However, he also felt the need to portray his 
own people as greater than the Macedonian king, as evidenced by the digression’s 
inclusion. Alexander had a significant influence on Livy’s thoughts and work, which he 
himself freely admitted, stating, “The very mention of this great king and commander 
[Alexander] evokes certain thoughts on which I have often brooded in silence.”
186
 Thus, 
Livy verified in his own writing the impact that Alexander still had on a Roman of the 
Late Republic and early Principate. More than three hundred years after his death, 
Alexander the Great still had considerable relevance to Livy.
187
 
The Impact of Alexander on Livy’s History Outside of the Digression 
 Let us begin with a brief discussion of the sections outside of the digression where 
Livy’ text either mentions Alexander the Great directly or where we can infer that Livy 
alludes to him from the contexts. In the majority of these examples, Livy expresses 
respect for Alexander and his successes, either directly or by implication. Outside of the 
digression and throughout the course of his narrative, whenever Livy mentions 
Alexander, it is usually in a positive manner. It would be a mistake to read Livy’s 
digression by itself and then formulate his entire opinion of Alexander without consulting 
the other examples. In fact, the main purpose of Livy’s digression, namely demonstrating 
why Alexander would have failed to conquer the Romans, lends itself to a critical stance 
on Alexander and his actions, which inherently limits a completely positive assessment. 
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The other passages relating to Alexander thus are necessary to get a balanced view of 
Livy’s assessment of the great king. Ultimately, Livy believed in Rome’s unmatched 
greatness, even when compared to Alexander. However, the following passages 
demonstrate that Livy shared the belief that Alexander was great himself. 
The Failure of an Alexander in Italy 
 The first mention of Alexander the Great in Livy’s extent history occurs in Book 
8 after a short introduction to the ill-fated invasion of Italy, in 334 B.C.E., by Alexander 
of Epirus, Alexander the Great’s uncle and brother-in-law.
188
 Almost foretelling the 
future troubles that the Romans would face at the hands of Pyrrhus decades later, 
Alexander, king of Molossia, sailed from Epirus to southern Italy at the behest of the city 
of Tarentum in order to lend it aid in a war against the Lucanians.
189
 Livy judged that 
Alexander of Epirus held vast ambitions for his invasion of Italy. Livy argues that this 
invasion was a threat to Rome because, had it been successful, Alexander of Epirus 
would have made war against the Romans.
190
  
Livy then quickly turned to Alexander the Great, stating, “This was also the era of 
the exploits of Alexander the Great, who was the son of this man's sister [Olympias, 
daughter of Neoptolemus], and who fortune snuffed out as a young man due to disease 
(iuvenem fortuna morbo exstinxit), in another quarter of the world, after proving himself 
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to be invincible in wars (invictum bellis).”
191
 Livy’s acknowledgement of Alexander’s 
negative fortuna resulting in his untimely death after proving himself invincible in war is 
striking, since later, in the digression, Livy argues the contrary position: “I do not dispute 
that Alexander was an exceptional general, but his reputation is enhanced by the fact that 
he died while still young and before he had time to experience any change of fortune 
(nondum alteram fortunam expertus).”
192
 In 8.3, this judgment is only one of several 
Livian statements that displays an attitude toward Alexander different from the one found 
in the digression, demonstrating the need for caution when looking at the digression and 
the importance of considering all of Livy’s thoughts on Alexander, found throughout his 
history, in order to establish his overall opinion. It seems that by dying of an illness 
unexpectedly at the height of his power Alexander in fact did suffer at the hands of 
fortune. In 8.3.7, Livy is not here denying Alexander’s ill fate as he later did in 9.17.5. 
We will return to this point later. 
In the second half of this statement, Livy demonstrates the highest respect for 
Alexander’s military accomplishments. He contrasts the invincibility of Alexander the 
Great in war with the failure of his uncle, by the same name, in Italy. Although Livy here 
acknowledges Alexander’s invincibility in war, he does not express this opinion in his 
digression. There, Livy’s text portrays Rome as superior to the great Macedonian in 
military matters. In addition, the digression changes the way one can interpret this 
passage. We can also understand Livy’s discussion, which contrasts the success of 
Alexander the Great with the failure of his uncle, as subtly linking – not contrasting – 
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The next mention of Alexander is again in association with Alexander of Epirus. 
Livy briefly records the course of Alexander of Epirus’ ill-fated invasion of Italy. 
Alexander, having been warned that his death awaited him at Pandosia and thinking that 
this meant Pandosia in Epirus, hurried to Italy where he enjoyed initial success.
194
 
Ultimately, his success led him to a ring of hills near Pandosia in Italy where poor 
weather allowed two thirds of his army to be ambushed.
195
 Through a great act of daring, 
Alexander and a portion of his force broke out of the trap and attempted to cross a nearby 
river where he was treacherously murdered by one of his Italian allies and later 
mutilated.
196
 It is only through the pity of a local woman that his bones were eventually 
returned to his family in Epirus.
197
 It is not insignificant that Livy digressed from his 
larger narrative and illustrated the failure of an Alexander in Italy. Livy mentions 
Alexander the Great at the end of this section as a relation of Alexander of Epirus through 
his mother Olympias, who was a recipient of her brother’s bones.
198
 
To be sure, there is nothing in this passage overtly negative toward Alexander the 
Great. Livy even describes Alexander of Epirus more as a victim of ill fortune than an 
evil or foolish character. However, this section is important for other reasons. As noted, 
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Livy explains that a discussion of Alexander of Epirus’ invasion is necessary, even 
though it did not directly affect Rome, because it involved a foreign force invading Italy 
and because he believed, had it been successful, that this Alexander would have made 
war on Rome.
199
 It was fortune that prevented this outcome.
200
 R. Morello convincingly 
argues that once we take the argument of Livy’s digression into account, by mentioning 
Alexander the Great in this passage, Livy may connect the disastrous invasion led by his 
uncle with Alexander himself, and his hypothetical invasion.
201
 For in his digression, 
Livy states, “He [Alexander the Great] would have seen in the passes of Apulia and the 
mountains of Lucania the traces of the recent disaster which befell his house when his 
uncle Alexander, King of Epirus, perished.”
202
 Livy’s association of Alexander with his 
uncle’s failed invasion of Italy becomes clear. 
In addition, it is not lost on the audience that the Lucanians, who decimated the 
army brought to Italy by Alexander of Epirus, ultimately were defeated by the Romans 
and subjected to Roman rule. In this sense, the Romans proved successful where 
Alexander of Epirus had failed. It can be argued that Livy possibly meant for this failure 
to reflect subtly on his kinsman, Alexander the Great. Either way, passage 8.24, although 
it is not a criticism, does not reflect well on Alexander the Great. Livy asserts 
Alexander’s military invincibility in 8.3.7. Yet, by twice mentioning him in association 
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with his uncle, who failed utterly in Italy, Livy seems to signal what he will argue in the 
digression about Alexander’s inability to obtain success against the Romans in Italy.
203
 
The Association of Papirius Cursor with Alexander the Great  
The third mention of Alexander occurs immediately prior to the digression, where 
the Livian hero Lucius Papirius Cursor is described as a possible equal to the great 
Macedonian. This discussion of Papirius prior to the digression is significant because it 
introduces topics such as Roman military discipline and the perpetuity of Rome’s 
authority.
204
 Livy, speaking of Papirius’ abilities, states,  
There can be no doubt that in his generation, in which no other was ever 
more productive in great qualities, there was no single man who did more 
to uphold the Roman State. Indeed people regard him as one who might 
indeed have been a match in spirit for Alexander the Great (quin eum 
parem destinant animis magno Alexandro ducem), if the latter, after 




By establishing Papirius as the greatest Roman of the greatest Roman generation and as a 
possible match for Alexander, Livy positioned himself well to launch into his digression. 
However, Livy’s discussion of Papirius’ qualities not only establishes the high level of 
competition that Livy felt Alexander would have faced during his invasion, it also helps 
establish Livy’s high opinion of Papirius’ Alexander-like qualities. No less significant, 
Livy implies that only the greatest Roman of the greatest generation might have been a 
match for Alexander. This attests to Livy’s high opinion of the great king. 
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 Next Livy documents the military abilities of Papirius, who in 309 B.C.E. 
celebrated a triumph over the Samnites.
206
 What follows in the text is a list of personal 
qualities, all of these traits commonly attributed to Alexander. Livy described Papirius as 
a great soldier who was high-spirited, strong, and fast of foot; he had a great capacity for 
food and wine; and
 
he was tough on his soldiers but shared in their toil, making him 
popular.
207




According to Livy, it was because of these qualities that Roman writers often 
compared Papirius to Alexander. By acknowledging the comparison, Livy recognized 
that these were the traditional qualities of Alexander and part of his image. Moreover, 
Livy positively describes almost all of the characteristics.
209
 This passage establishes 
Livy’s positive perception of Alexander. In depicting a Roman counterpart to Alexander, 
Livy in fact expressed his own opinion of what it meant to be worthy of that comparison. 
For Livy, Alexander was the apex of military quality and it would have taken the greatest 
of Romans to match him. 
The Piety of Alexander, the Piety of Scipio 
 Outside of this digression, Alexander does not make another appearance in Livy’s 
work for another seventeen books.
210
 In Book 26, Livy links Publius Cornelius Scipio 
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Africanus, another one of the greatest Roman military leaders, to Alexander. Details 
about Scipio’s early military career and success rendered this a plausible match. Indeed, 
Livy’s text connects the legend of Scipio with the legend of Alexander. In 211 B.C.E., 
Scipio, then in his mid-twenties, was offered the command in Spain after the deaths of his 
father and uncle in battle against the Carthaginians during the Second Punic War.
211
 Livy 
relates that from his youth Scipio claimed a connection with the gods through dreams and 
visions that carried messages and commands.
212
 As a young man, he established a 
specific connection with Jupiter by spending time in the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus 
every day before commencing any business.
213
 In response to this, Livy states,  
This practice, which was adhered to through the whole of his life, 
occasioned in some persons a belief in a notion which generally prevailed, 
whether deliberately propagated or not, that he [Scipio] was a man of 
divine extraction; and revived a report as equally absurd and fabulous as 
that formerly spread regarding Alexander the Great, that he [Scipio] was 
begotten by a huge serpent, whose monstrous form was frequently 
observed in the bedchamber of his mother, but which, on anyone's coming 




Some thus perceived Scipio in the likeness of Alexander and Livy records that Scipio not 
only did nothing to deny this suggested link, but he even attempted to strengthen it.
215
 In 
general, this section parallels the sentiments of 10.2 and 10.5 of Polybius. However, 
Polybius made no mention there of Scipio resembling Alexander. It is not trivial that 
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Livy offers the Alexander comparison, as it demonstrates Livy’s keen interest in Roman 
associations with Alexander. 
To be fair, Livy did not believe in the validity of the stories of Alexander’s and 
Scipio’s snake conceptions, and in fact, dismissed them. However, a refusal to believe in 
the legend does not make the association insignificant. By including the comparison, 
Livy indicates an interest in such associations. Additionally, the snake legend is not the 
only topic discussed in this section. Here Livy associates Scipio, albeit indirectly, with 
Alexander, owing to their piety, and attributed him with superhuman qualities. We 
discussed both of these aspects of Alexander’s character in our analysis of Polybius.
216
  
Livy finishes this passage by asserting that attributes and actions such as these 
established Scipio as greater than other men.
217
 As in the previously discussed passage on 
Papirius, by complimenting Scipio in a passage where he is linked to Alexander, Livy 
also subtly passes positive judgment on Alexander. Livy thus recognizes a tremendous 
sense of piety in both men. Additionally, both men exploited a commonly held belief 
through their association with the divine to inspire the masses and accomplish great 
deeds. The fears of the Roman citizenry about giving such immense responsibility to 
Scipio at a young age disappeared as they perceived that, like Alexander, Scipio was a 
great man and a favorite of the gods.
218
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Alexander Compared to Pyrrhus, Hannibal, and Scipio 
 The next appearance of Alexander in the text occurs nine books later. In Book 35, 
Livy relates a story about the famous meeting between Scipio Africanus and Hannibal. 
Prior to the war with Antiochus the Great, Roman delegates were present in Asia Minor. 
After a meeting with King Eumenes of Pergamum, who advocated war between Rome 
and Antiochus, Publius Villius, one of the Roman commissioners, travelled to 
Ephesus.
219
 Once in Ephesus, Villius met several times with Hannibal, who five years 
after his defeat in the Second Punic War had now left his homeland for the East and was 
offering his skills as an advisor to Antiochus.
220
 Nothing of great importance came out of 
these meetings; however, Livy states that some historians record Scipio as present at 
these gatherings and carrying on a conversation with his one time nemesis.
221
 
 The inclusion of the story, which most scholars believe untrue, further emphasizes 
both Livy’s respect for Alexander and his belief that the Romans were greater.
222
 We 
should mention that Livy does not question the authenticity of the account. The story, and 
its persistence over the centuries, illustrates a late republican fascination with and 
admiration for Alexander. Therefore, we should not disregard it completely as a telling 
example of how the two greatest generals of their time saw themselves or how others saw 
them in relation to Alexander. Livy relates the conversation thusly: 
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Scipio asked Hannibal, “whom he thought the greatest general of all 
time.” And he answered, “Alexander, king of Macedonia; because, with a 
small band, he defeated armies whose numbers were beyond reckoning; 
and because he had overrun the remotest regions, the mere visiting of 
which was a thing above human aspiration.” Scipio then asked, “to whom 
he gave the second place.” And he replied, “To Pyrrhus; for he first taught 
the method of encamping; and besides, no one ever showed more exquisite 
judgment, in choosing his ground, and disposing his posts; while he also 
possessed the art of conciliating mankind to himself to such a degree, that 
the nations of Italy wished him, though a foreign prince, to hold the 
sovereignty among them, rather than the Roman people, who had so long 
possessed the dominion of that part of the world.” On him [Scipio] 
proceeding to ask, “whom he esteemed the third.” Hannibal replied, 
“Myself, beyond doubt.” On this Scipio laughed, and added, “What would 
you have said if you had conquered me?” “Then,” replied the other, “I 
would have placed Hannibal, not only before Alexander and Pyrrhus, but 
before all other commanders.” This answer, turned with Punic dexterity, 
and conveying an unexpected kind of flattery, was highly gratifying to 





Livy thus linked Alexander, Pyrrhus, Hannibal, and Scipio all within one passage. Livy’ 
text here presents an exclusive club of the greatest generals of the ancient world. We can 
deduce a great deal from this passage. 
 First, in this story both Hannibal and Scipio place Alexander above all others 
without argument. This gives us a sense that, according to Livy, for the leading kings, 
generals, and statesmen of the ancient world, Alexander was present in thought, aspired 
to in accomplishment, and the measuring stick for all who followed him. This is because 
of the breadth of his conquests and his ability to overcome insurmountable odds. 
Livy here also awards high praise to Pyrrhus, the cousin of Alexander.
224
 Unlike 
the two passages involving the failure of Alexander of Epirus, this praise of Alexander 
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the Great’s second cousin mostly reflects well upon Alexander. This is not direct praise 
by Livy; but by including this story, Livy indicates that he approved its messages. This 
scene furnishes a list of the greatest generals in an order that Livy does not challenge. We 
also find the theme of great generals from the third century B.C.E. emulating Alexander’s 
vigor in war only to fall short of his universally accepted supremacy. By the late first 
century B.C.E., little had changed to remove Alexander from his prestigious and 
dominant position in the minds of the Romans, as Livy’s incorporation of this passage 
into his work indicates.
225
 
One further aspect we should discussed is that although the ancients recognized 
Pyrrhus as one of history’s greatest generals, his invasion of Italy eventually failed, as 
had that of Alexander of Epirus. Additionally, the main difference between Alexander of 
Epirus’ invasion and Pyrrhus’ was that the latter had clashed with the Romans. Although 
Pyrrhus came out the victor in two major battles, at Heraclea in 280 B.C.E. and Asculum 
in 279 B.C.E., ultimately he failed to conquer Rome and later was forced to abandon the 
territory that he had gained in Italy after the costly stalemate at Beneventum in 275 
B.C.E. This passage does not mention directly Pyrrhus’ ultimate failure to subdue the 
Romans; however, Hannibal’s defeat at the hands of the Romans might remind the 
audience of Pyrrhus’ failure.  
Since Pyrrhus desired to represent himself in the image of Alexander and since he 
brought a well experienced army in the style of Alexander’s to Italy, it is not difficult to 
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imagine Livy’s interpretation of Pyrrhus’ unsuccessful invasion.
226
 Unfortunately, Livy’s 
account of the Pyrrhic War is not extant. All that remains are the excerpts of the 
Periochae, which relate the following: 
[In 280 B.C.E.] King Pyrrhus of the Epirotes came to Italy to support the 
Tarentines. . . . Consul [Publius] Valerius Lavinius unsuccessfully fought 
against Pyrrhus [at Heraclea], especially because the soldiers were not 
used to the elephants and were terrified. After the battle, Pyrrhus inspected 
the bodies of the Romans that had fallen during the fight and noticed that 
they were all directed against their enemy. Pillaging the country, he 
proceeded to the city of Rome. The Senate sent Gaius Fabricius to Pyrrhus 
to negotiate the return of the prisoners-of-war. In vain, the king tried to 
persuade him to abandon his country. The prisoners were released without 
payment. Pyrrhus' deputy Cineas was sent to the Senate to organize the 
king's entrance into the city to negotiate a peace treaty. It was decided to 
discuss this matter with all the senators, but Appius Claudius (who had not 
visited the deliberations for a long time because he suffered from an eye 
disease) came to the Senate and persuaded the senators with his speech not 
to give up. Gnaeus Domitius, the first plebeian censor, celebrated the 
lustrum ceremony. 287,222 citizens were registered. [In 279 B.C.E.] For 
the second time, the Romans fought unsuccessfully against Pyrrhus [at 
Asculum]. . . . When consul Gaius Fabricius heard from someone who had 
fled from Pyrrhus, that he could poison the king, he sent him back to the 
king with a report of what he had done. It [book 13] also contains an 
account of the successful wars against the Lucanians, Bruttians, Samnites, 
and Etruscans. [In 278 B.C.E.] Pyrrhus went to Sicily. . . . When consul 
Curius Dentatus was recruiting an army, he sold the possessions of a man 
who had not appeared. [In 275] He defeated Pyrrhus [at Beneventum], 
who had returned, and expelled him from Italy. . . . The censors celebrated 





There are several points of interest in this summary of Livy’s account. Although the 
Romans lost in the first battle, they fought bravely. Pyrrhus did not successfully convince 
a prominent Roman to turn traitor, though Pyrrhus admired the man. Pyrrhus marched on 
Rome unsuccessfully and the Romans refused to come to terms of peace. Although the 
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Romans lost in the second battle, they proved themselves honorable by returning a 
would-be assassin to Pyrrhus. Additionally, successful wars against his allies mitigated 
Rome’s loses to Pyrrhus.  
The immediate pairing of a Roman defeat with a series of “revenge” expeditions 
is a theme of Livy’s work, which he further develops when describing the Roman defeat 
at the Caudine Forks and its aftermath (9.8-16).
228
 In addition, the summary praises the 
Romans for expelling Pyrrhus from Italy following the Battle of Beneventum. This battle 
cannot be claimed as the sole cause for Pyrrhus’ leaving Italy since it was Pyrrhus’ 
inability to secure reinforcements from the East that may have forced his departure.
229
 In 
addition, he did not leave Italy immediately and, when departing, did not give up hopes 
of a return, leaving a strong garrison at Tarentum.
230
 However, victory was costly. The 
16,000 person drop in the number of citizens in the census between 280-275 B.C.E., over 
a five percent total population decrease, speaks to the heavy Roman losses suffered in the 
Pyrrhic War. 
 There are similarities between themes figuring in the Periochae and those found 
in Livy’s preserved work. These similarities help us to decipher some of what Livy’s 
opinions and goals would have been in the original text. The summary represents the 
                                                 
228
 Although Livy argued that the Romans avenged their defeat at the Caudine Forks after a series 
of victories and thus forced the Samnites to come to peace terms, modern scholars highly dispute this 
version of events. See T. J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the 
Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC) (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995), 353; E. T. Salmon, Samnium and the 
Samnites (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 226ff; and M. W. Frederiksen, review of 
Samnium and the Samnites, by E. T. Salmon, Journal of Roman Studies 58, Parts 1 and 2 (1968): 226. 
Ultimately, the revenge campaign that Livy’s text describes is fantasy. Note Oakley, Commentary III, 34-
38. For Livy’s use of this section concerning the digression, see Morello, “Livy’s Alexander Digression,” 
73, 74, 75, 81, and 83. 
229






mighty Pyrrhus as no match for the resilience of Rome, and it emphasizes Rome’s 
ultimate victory. Pyrrhus’ invasion of Italy, like that of Alexander of Epirus’, failed. It 
also is important to remember here that Livy associated Alexander the Great with Pyrrhus 
elsewhere in his work.
231
 Hence, in Livy’s missing account of the Pyrrhic War, further 
associations of Pyrrhus with Alexander the Great seem probable.  
Yet, ultimately in 35.14.5-10, Livy may have subtly associated Alexander with 
another relative who failed to conquer Italy. Alexander’s hypothetical failure in the 
digression, added to Livy’s account of Pyrrhus’ failed invasion preserved by the 
Periochae, and the later direct association between Pyrrhus and Alexander connect these 
subjects for Livy’s audience. Livy linked not only the skills of Pyrrhus’ generalship but 
also his inability to conquer Rome indirectly to Alexander. Livy may well have been 
thinking partially of Pyrrhus when he came to his judgment in the digression about 
Alexander the Great’s inability to succeed in Italy.  
 The second half of the scene between Scipio and Hannibal is as important as the 
first in establishing Livy’s overall opinion of Alexander. Because of Scipio’s victory over 
Hannibal in the Second Punic War, the story portrays Scipio as shocked when Hannibal 
ranked himself in the third position. Hannibal states that conquering the Romans would 
have made him the greatest general of all time, eclipsing even Alexander. In addition, in 
order to conquer the Romans, Hannibal would have had to defeat Scipio. Livy thus 
suggests his own deep respect for the generalship of Scipio by including the passage, and 
the passage itself recognizes the greatness of the Romans. By conquering Rome, 
Hannibal would have displaced Alexander, who only conquered easterners. This theme 
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will reappear in the digression. Again, we see Livy using a passage in his history to 
establish the theme of Alexander as great, but the Romans as greater. Finally, as Morello 
argues, once we consider the digression in connection with this passage, Rome has the 
honor of defeating all three of the greatest generals of all time.
232
 Livy’s effort to 
establish of the Romans as the mightiest of all powers was complete.
233
 
 The next passage involving Alexander is of little importance. Livy explains how 
Alexander of Megalopolis claimed decent from Alexander the Great and, to this point, 
had named his two sons Philip and Alexander.
234
 The claim was dubious; but Philip, due 
to his gullible and vain nature, aspired to the Macedonian throne with the backing of 
Antiochus III and the Aetolians.
235
 Here Alexander’s name is associated with the actions 
of a fool; however, it is clear that Livy did not believe in the family connection and hence 
did not pass negative judgment on Alexander. 
Parallels between the Roman Victory at Magnesia and Alexander’s Victory at 
Gaugamela 
 Two books later, Livy recorded the Roman victory over Antiochus III at the 
Battle of Magnesia in 189 B.C.E. This section does not mention Alexander directly. 
Nevertheless, Livy’s description of the battle, which he likely based on a Polybian 
account no longer extant, nearly parallels Alexander’s victory over the Persian King 
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 Livy 35.47.5 
235




Darius III at Gaugamela in 331 B.C.E.
236
 Since Polybius was likely the source of the 
account, this has further implications for our study. Much of what we discuss about Livy 
in this section we can associate with Polybius as well.  
In the description of the armies and battle, we can interpret Livy’s (or Polybius’) 
portrayal of the Romans in the light of Alexander’s army at Gaugamela, and the 
rendering of Antiochus as a second Darius fits this model as well. In Livy’s account, the 
vastly outnumbered yet elite Roman army decimates the immense, eclectic eastern army 
of Antiochus after he fled the battlefield. The parallels are striking.  
  Livy recorded Antiochus’ strength at 60,000 infantry and more than 12,000 
cavalry prior to the battle.
237
 He also recorded the Roman army, with its Greek allies, at 
about 27,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.
238
 At the Battle of Gaugamela, Arrian recorded 
Alexander’s army at 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry.
239
 Darius III’s numbers are 
immensely controversial, especially in infantry numbers.
240
 However, since Darius’ 
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infantry proved of little use in the battle, modern scholars have placed emphasis almost 
solely on his cavalry strength, where Arrian’s assessment of 40,000 and Curtius Rufus’ 
evaluation of 45,000 appear appropriate.
241
 Thus, although the historical tradition 
established an enormous difference in infantry at Gaugamela, which clearly dwarfs that 
found at Magnesia, the discrepancy in cavalry is similar for Alexander and the Romans. 
The ancients clearly saw Gaugamela as one of the most lopsided battles of all time; and 
therefore, the greatest victory in history. Also, this study is not arguing that Livy (or 
Polybius) saw Magnesia as Gaugamela’s equal; rather, Livy’s account shows several 
parallels between Magnesia and Gaugamela, which have implications for the Livian (and 
Polybian) theme of associating Rome with Alexander. Ultimately, what is important to 
take from this is that both Alexander and the Romans faced a vast eastern army, far 
outnumbering their own. 
 Livy’s text describes Antiochus’ army, like Darius’, as a force of many different 
races and equipment.
242
 Antiochus, again like Darius, used his great advantage in cavalry 
to extend his line out well past the extent of his enemy’s front.
243
 Also included in both 
eastern armies were elephants and scythe chariots, which in both battles were meant to be 
difference makers but proved to offer no advantage.
244
 John Briscoe also makes this 
connection, stating that Gaugamela was “the only other occasion when they [scythe 
chariots] were intended to play a significant part in a major battle, with equally disastrous 
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 In both battles, a gap opened in the left center of the line due to 
miscalculations (on the part of Antiochus and Darius) involving the scythe chariots.
246
 
Furthermore, in both battles, the Romans and Alexander exploited this gap with a cavalry 
charge, creating mass confusion and the general rout of the enemy left.
247
 Both 
Antiochus’ and Darius’ cavalry on the right wing achieved some success and threatened 
the enemy camp; however, the Romans’ and Alexander’s left flank held long enough to 
allow reinforcements and cavalry from the successful right to arrive in relief.
248
 Most 
tellingly, just like Darius, Antiochus fled the battlefield and his army was slaughtered.
249
 
Our sources also report that both the Romans and Alexander suffered few casualties.
250
 
 Gaugamela and Magnesia were significant war-ending battles. Darius effectively 
lost his control over the Persian Empire and the Romans forced Antiochus to abandon all 
his lands west of the Taurus Mountains.
251
 Both Alexander and the Romans had toppled 
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the mighty power of the East. Their victories established Alexander as the conqueror of 
Persia and the Romans as the new, undisputed hegemon of the Mediterranean world. 
Both events signaled a rise to supremacy as the ultimate power in their own respective 
times.  
Livy’s (and Polybius’) account of the Battle of Magnesia mirrors the ancient 
descriptions of the Battle of Gaugamela, with which Polybius especially would have been 
familiar through his studies, in so many instances that it is difficult not to see the 
connection.
252
 Through Livy’s (and Polybius’) description of the Roman victory at 
Magnesia, one can see Rome’s maturation in its role of Alexander’s true successor. The 
analogy made between these two battles has much to say about Livy’s (and Polybius’) 
respect for the accomplishments of Alexander and the belief in Rome’s destiny. 
The Lingering Reputation of Alexander  
 Another passage worth mentioning concerns King Perseus’ dilemma of whether 
or not to wage war against the Romans. In 171 B.C.E., it looked as though another 
military clash between Rome and Macedon was inevitable. The Romans decided to 
mobilize for war and Perseus had to decide whether to sue for peace or risk everything in 
battle.
253
 In the Macedonian council, Livy emphasized Macedon as the last major power 
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left to challenge Roman supremacy.
254
 In 42.50.7, Livy relates, “There now remained 
only the kingdom of Macedonia near in situation [to Rome], and which might seem able, 
if anywhere the fortune of Rome should waver, to inspire its kings with the spirit of their 
forefathers.” There is a sense here of the might once wielded by the Macedonians under 
Philip II and Alexander. Conversely, there is an element of concern that the power of 
Macedon, built by Philip and Alexander, was still dangerous to Rome. This passage 
emphasizes the success of Philip II in making Macedon a regional power and Alexander 
in making Macedon a world power. 
 This point of view continues in another passage closely following and likely 
based on an original Polybian account as well.
255
 In this section, Perseus musters his 
army and after their drills addresses his troops about the upcoming war with Rome.
256
 
Livy relates that Perseus called the Romans deceitful and told his men that they not only 
surpassed the Romans in skill and training, but also had better auxiliaries, better 
equipment, and were better supplied.
257
 Perseus then tells his soldiers that they must 
show the spirit of their ancestors. Livy records the following, “They [the soldiers] must 
have, too, the spirit which their ancestors had possessed, who, having subdued all Europe 
(qui Europa omni domita), had crossed to Asia and opened up with their arms a whole 
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unknown world, and had not ceased their conquests, until, confined within the Red Sea 
[i.e. the Indian Ocean in these contexts], when nothing remained for them to conquer 
(quod vincerent, defuerit).”
258
 Livy’s text thus emphasizes the vastness of Alexander’s 
conquests, and it acknowledges the extent to which he pushed the conception of the 
known world. Again, Livy emphasizes his military vigor and the tremendous limits to 
which he could push his men. We should also keep in mind that Polybius and Livy 
considered that the Antigonids, including Perseus, were direct descendants of Alexander 
the Great, who all shared in the reputation of his house.
259
  
Livy’s Claim of Roman Superiority through the Domination of the World once Ruled by 
Alexander 
Alexander directly appears in Livy’s text again between the last two previously 
discussed passages. Here, Livy mentions Alexander in connection with King Perseus and 
his army. He reports that through the careful planning of his father, Philip V, Perseus was 
able to field 39,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry.
260
 Livy regarded this force as the largest 
Macedonian force ever assembled since Alexander.
261
 In Livy’s digression, he argues that 
Alexander would have been able to cross to Italy with no more than 30,000 Macedonian 
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 Furthermore, Livy emphasizes the great potential and large aspirations of 
Perseus by associating him and his army with Alexander.
263
 Conversely, Livy establishes 
the magnitude of Rome’s future victory over Perseus by linking him and his army with 
Alexander. In the last three passages discussed, Livy associates Alexander and the 
greatness of Macedon under his leadership with Perseus, whom the Romans ultimately 
defeated, ending the Macedonian kingdom. Livy’s text portrays Alexander as the 
architect of Macedon’s rise to world prominence. It is clear that Livy had respect for this 
accomplishment. However, this greatness also is tied to the failure of Alexander’s last 
successor.
264
 Again, we see the process of recognizing Alexander as great but preparing 
to characterize the Romans as greater. Throughout these passages, Livy portrays Rome’s 




After the decisive Roman victory at the Battle of Pydna in 168 B.C.E., most of 
Macedonia surrendered to Rome and Perseus fled to Samothrace, where he soon 
surrendered.
266
 As Perseus’ capture was a massive spectacle, Livy referred to him as the 
greatest prisoner of war ever held by the Romans.
267
 As seen in the previous illustrations, 
Livy associates Alexander with the fall of Perseus and the victory of Rome. Hence, Livy 
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states, “Perseus was the chief enemy, and not only his own reputation and that of his 
father, grandfather, and the rest to whom he was related by blood and stock made him a 
figure of universal interest, but the glory of Philip and Alexander the Great, who made 
the Macedonians masters of the world, shone upon him.”
268
  
Again, Livy clearly respected the accomplishments of Alexander. At 45.7.4-5, 
Livy also depicts Aemilius Paulus as showing reverence toward Perseus because of the 
honor and legend of his house, stating: 
Perseus entered the camp in mourning garb without a single attendant to 
make him more pitiable by sharing his misfortunes. His only companion 
was his son. Owing to the crowd who surrounded him he was unable to 
make any progress until the consul [Aemilius Paulus] sent his lictors to 
clear a passage for him to the headquarters tent. After asking the rest to 
keep their seats the consul went forward a few steps and held out his hand 
to the king as he entered, and when he was going to prostrate himself he 
raised him to his feet and would not allow him to embrace his knees as a 
suppliant. Once inside the tent, he bade him take his seat facing the 
members of the council. 
 
Livy continues, “When the council had broken up, the custody of the king was entrusted 
to Q. Aelius. On that day he was invited to dine with the council, and every mark of 
honor was shown to him which could be shown to anyone in his position.”
269
 Livy 
thereby points to respect on the part of the Romans for Perseus and his house. Yet, it is 
the connection between Alexander and the end of his family line at the hands of the 
Romans that is of particular relevance. Livy represents Rome as the power that 
eliminated the state made great by Alexander. Livy presents Rome as becoming 
Alexander’s true successor after Magnesia; while at Pydna, Livy portrays the Romans as 
finally supplanting the great Macedonian. 
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Livy clearly articulates these points again as he concludes his discussion of the 
Third Macedonian War. He thoroughly emphasizes the tradition, experience, reputation, 
and former greatness of Macedon, as well as the magnitude and the finality of its end. 
Again, Livy’s text offers Alexander’s accomplishments praise for their magnitude. 
However, the larger point that he makes by praising the eminence of Macedon, is the 
glorious role of Rome in ending Macedonian power. Livy declares:  
This was the end of the war between the Romans and Perseus, after four 
years of steady campaigning, and also the end of a kingdom famed over a 
large part of Europe and all of Asia. They reckoned Perseus as the 
twentieth after Caranus, who founded the kingdom. Perseus ascended the 
throne in the consulship of Quintus Fulvius and Lucius Manlius, and was 
recognized as king by the senate in the consulship of Marcus Junius and 
Aulus Manlius; his reign lasted eleven years. The Macedonian nation was 
of no great reputation until the time of Philip [II], son of Amyntas. Later, 
when it had proceeded to expand under him, it was still confined within 
the bounds of Europe, though embracing all Greece and part of Thrace and 
Illyricum. Thereafter it overflowed into Asia, and Alexander, in the 
thirteen years of his reign, first brought under his sway all the well-nigh 
boundless empire that had belonged to the Persians, and then traversed 
Arabia and India, where the Indian Ocean embraces the uttermost ends of 
the earth. At that time the empire and name of the Macedonians was 
greatest on earth; thereafter at the death of Alexander it was torn into 
many kingdoms, as each leader snatched at resources for his own account, 
and its strength was dismembered; yet it endured for a hundred fifty years 




Livy attempts to make several points in this passage. He contends that through the 
leadership of Philip II and Alexander, Macedon went from obscurity to world dominance 
in only a few decades. However, he couples this meteoric rise with a swift 
dismemberment of Macedon’s power after Alexander’s death. Similarly, Livy’s history 
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emphasizes Rome’s steady climb to hegemony under the sturdy guidance of the Roman 
Senate, despite drastic reverses. Livy makes these same arguments in the digression as 
well.
271
 In this passage, Livy stresses the stupendous exploits of Alexander.  However, by 
noting the speed of his conquests and the equally fast destruction of his empire following 
his death, Livy also possibly signals the irrelevance of Alexander’s accomplishments as 
compared to those of Rome.
272
 This passage illustrates the past grandeur of Macedon in 
order to emphasize the greatness of Rome’s accomplishment. 
Alexander Marches Through the Streets of Rome as a Captive 
In our final passage, Livy continues his theme of attaching Alexander’s name to 
Perseus’ failure and hence underscoring the greatness of Rome. He relates that the 
soldiers of Aemilius Paulus, returning home after their decisive victory in the Third 
Macedonian War, expressed anger over his old-fashioned discipline and his perceived 
stinginess toward his troops.
273
 In response, they threatened to vote against Paulus’ right 
to hold a triumph for his victory over Macedon.
274
 Livy’s text records that Marcus 
Servilius made a lengthy speech against this notion. One of his main arguments for the 
triumph is that glory would be given to the Roman people if the army forced Perseus to 
walk as a captive in the procession. Marcus Servilius is said to have mentioned the 
triumphs held over Philip V and Antiochus III. Since Perseus was not only defeated but 
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also captured, Servilius argued that it only made sense to celebrate this event.
275
 He 
emphasized that the display of Perseus, whom all recognized as a mighty king, was the 
greatest show of all.
276
  
In addition to the king, Marcus Servilius also mentioned his two sons as a worthy 
sight for all of Rome. In 45.39.7, Livy relates the following, “Shall the captured king, 
Perseus, with his sons, Philip and Alexander, bearers of such mighty names, be 
withdrawn from the eager gaze of the state?”
277
 This passage refers to Alexander the 
Great directly, via the boys’ “mighty names.” Livy thus meant for this story to contribute 
to his theme, found throughout his larger work, of representing the Romans as superior to 
Alexander. Additionally, Perseus’ sons were symbols of the Roman domination over all 
of Macedon, from its rise to greatness to its fall.  
Livy describing Philip and Alexander marching in defeat through the streets of 
Rome is also highly emblematic of Roman superiority. The symbol is significant, and the 
implied connection is clear. The young sons of the king carried a profound figurative and 
psychological message to the people of Rome and in Livy’s history. Livy’s text 
emphasizes this concept in detail and exaggerates it in his digression. Livy clearly here 
establishes the supremacy of Rome. The mighty power built by Philip II and Alexander 
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the Great was gone; the Macedonian sun had set.
278
 It was Rome that proved the greater 
state, and it was now Rome’s responsibility and right to shape the world. Ultimately, the 
eagle of Rome replaced the lion of Alexander.
279
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How Livy’s Digression on Alexander Fits into the Larger Narrative of His History 
Discussing the Livian examples of Alexander the Great found outside of Livy’s 
digression better allows us to situate his digression within the broader scope of his work. 
The digression cannot serve as the only point of reference when dealing with Livy’s 
opinion of Alexander. The other passages mentioned in the previous sections, when we 
add them to the digression and take everything as a whole, create a more nuanced account 
of Livy’s thoughts on Alexander and the role that Alexander plays in Livy’s work. It is 
now time to turn our attention to Livy’s digression on Alexander the Great’s hypothetical 
invasion of Italy. First, we must examine why such a digression fits into Livy’s larger 
narrative, and why the digression would have proved both understandable and appealing 
to his audience. 
Scholars have long debated the exact purpose and relevance of the digression to 
Livy’s larger narrative.
280
 Ruth Morello sees the debate as a divide between Anglophone 
and Continental scholars.
281
 For many years, the Anglophone scholars, led by W. B. 
Anderson, believed the digression was a “long-winded,” “irrelevant,” and “juvenile” 
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showpiece that Livy later added into his text.
282
 Yet, Oakley thoroughly rejects 
Anderson’s arguments and states that few now follow this school of thought.
283
  
Continental scholars, led by P. Treves, saw the digression as a significant element 
in the text and refocused the debate on what was the reasoning for the digression and 
where it was supposed to fit in the narrative trajectory that Livy was constructing for 
Roman history.
284
 We should note that whether the digression was an earlier rhetorical 
exercise (later inserted into the work by Livy) or a passionate response to the 
contemporary literary attacks made by Greek writers on the waning Roman military 
reputation of the mid to late first century B.C.E. (because of recent failures in the East), 
the digression still demonstrates the clear impact of Alexander on Livy’s history, and his 
own interest in the Alexander topic.
285
 However, it is generally accepted that the 
digression was not a later insert, and that it adds to our understanding of the larger 
narrative, as we shall discuss below. The incorporation of Livy’s digression into his 
larger narrative makes its relative importance and broad implications all the more 
effective. 
Treves argued that the digression should have been placed in Book 8 and did not 
think that it had a link with Book 9, only surfacing there because Book 8 had been 
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 E. Burck, J. Lipovsky, and V. Santangelo put forth the idea that the 
digression was a post-Caudine Forks apologetic, established in order to distract the reader 
and cover up the Roman failure.
287
 Oakley views the placement of the digression as 
significant when read against the background of Roman recovery.
288
 He argues that the 
purpose of the digression was to emphasize Roman greatness and resilience.
289
  
Others observe the digression as a Livian commentary on the dangers of one man 
rule, and as connected with contemporary events, possibly even criticizing Augustus.
290
 
Oakley thinks that the digression may reflect contemporary events; but it is unclear which 
events.
291
 By connecting his digression with contemporary events and people, however, 
Livy yet again associates the Romans with Alexander. Livy thus continues to utilize the 
great Macedonian as a figure of example, whose conduct further establishes right and 
wrong. 
As noted previously, Morello relates that other scholars have preferred to see the 
digression as a response to recent Roman failures against Parthia and as an attack on 
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 R. M. Ogilvie put forth this idea earlier, arguing that the 
digression was Livy’s attempt to respond to contemporary Roman criticism of apparent 
Roman weakness in the face of the Parthians.
293
 According to Ogilvie, in order to combat 
the recent humiliating defeats suffered by Rome at the hands of the Parthians, Livy 
wished to show that, ultimately, even “Alexander was no match for the rugged 
determination of the Romans.”
294
 Thus, the placement of the digression “serves to 
highlight the theme of the first section of the History — how from humble beginnings 
Rome became a world power.”
295
 It is not insignificant that Livy chose Alexander as his 
subject.  
Morello appropriately argues that none of these interpretations is fully satisfying 
because they each are based on limited evidence and restrict what messages we can 
gather from Livy’s work.
296
 Instead, she argues that “we have too rarely made a serious 
attempt to understand the digression as historiographically legitimate, as participating in 
debates inherited from Livy's predecessors, and as a vital contribution to the architecture 
of the second pentad. . . . The digression is densely allusive, both to Livy's own work and 
to that of his predecessors.”
297
 With this, we can appreciate that the digression builds on 
many facets of Livy’s earlier work.  
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Livy connected part of his aim in this digression to the goals he established in the 
Preface for writing his history.
298
 Morello argues, “The digression encourages the reader, 
then, to think back to historiographical issues raised in the Preface [such as great men of 
the early period, stress on the perfection of the early military, and Roman society in 
general], and to consider the interaction between Livy's text and those of two of his most 
influential predecessors [Cato and Ennius].”
299
 In addition, the digression builds upon the 
idea of Rome’s rise to greatness and the coming struggle with the other powers of the 
Mediterranean world found in passage 7.29.1-2.
300
 Livy meant for the digression to 
follow and expand upon the Papirian material found in Book 8, which introduces topics 
such as military discipline and the perpetuity of Rome’s authority.
301
 In addition, as 
mentioned previously in this study, Livy also meant for Alexander of Epirus’ disastrous 
invasion of Italy to be a precursor to the digression.
302
  
Morello’s article details six viable reasons for why Book 9 is the proper place for 
the digression: the counterfactual model of the digression works well when paired with 
the Caudine section; the digression emphasizes Roman resilience and inability to accept 
defeat; it further promotes Livy’s belief that success follows the harmonizing of the 
soldiers and the citizen body; it emphasizes the established theme of age over youth; 
Book 9 has already set up the topography that will feature in the digression; and the 
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attention paid to Papirius.
303
 Morello thus confirms Book 9 as the correct placement of 
Livy’s digression.  
The digression proves to have several motives behind it, and we should 
understand it as an integral part of Livy’s greater history. It is fundamental in helping 
establish the greater themes and opinions that extend through the entire work. One of 
these themes is Livy’s firm belief that Alexander was great, but the Romans were greater, 
the effects of which are far reaching and heavily clad in symbolism, as we saw in the 
previous sections. 
A Roman Tradition of Alexander Counterfactual 
With the position of the digression within the greater context of the narrative 
clarified and the reasons for Livy’s inclusion of the digression established, we must now 
briefly discuss why Livy’s Roman audience would have found the digression interesting 
and the message behind it surprising. Livy’s digression is the most famous example from 
antiquity of counterfactual history.
304
 The counterfactual history found in Livy’s 




We find possibly the earliest surviving recorded case in Plutarch’s record of the 
speech of Appius Claudius Caecus, who in 280 B.C.E. railed against the possibilities of 
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coming to peace terms with Pyrrhus after the Battle of Heraclea.
306
 Plutarch relates the 
scene as follows: 
Then Appius raised himself up where he was and said: “Up to this time, 
O Romans, I have regarded the misfortune to my eyes as an affliction, but 
it now distresses me that I am not deaf as well as blind, that I might not 
hear the shameful resolutions and decrees of years which bring low the 
glory of Rome. For what becomes of the words that you are ever 
reiterating to all the world, namely, that if the great Alexander of renown 
had come to Italy and had come into conflict with us, when we were 
young men, and with our fathers, when they were in their prime, he would 
not now be celebrated as invincible, but would either have fled, or, 
perhaps, have fallen there, and so have left Rome more glorious 
still? Surely you are proving that this was boasting and empty bluster, 
since you are afraid of Chaonians and Molossians, who were ever the prey 
of the Macedonians, and you tremble before Pyrrhus, who has ever been a 
minister and servitor to one at least of Alexander's bodyguards, and now 
comes wandering over Italy, not so much to help the Greeks who dwell 
here, as to escape his enemies at home, promising to win for us the 
supremacy here with that army which could not avail to preserve for him a 




It is possible that the Alexander reference was a fabrication created by Plutarch for 
rhetorical purposes; however, there is nothing intrinsically false about this reference and 
we should not dismiss its plausibility outright.
308
 Further, through both the counterfactual 
speculation and synkrisis on Alexander, plus the sources that Livy used (9.16.9: “Had 
Alexander the Great, after subjugating Asia, turned his attention to Europe, there are 
many who maintain that he would have met his match in Papirius”), Livy’s work 
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demonstrates that the tradition was already present and established by his period.
309
 It 
persisted well into Late Antiquity as well. Emperor Julian took part in this tradition in the 




In addition, Morello establishes Alexander as a Roman favorite for rhetorical 
presentation.
311
 Oakley thus argues that Livy possibly based his digression on some such 
comparison found in his sources.
312
 Livy did not invent the debate of Alexander versus 
the Romans; rather, what he heard or read concerning Alexander influenced him.
313
 
Associations of Rome with Alexander and the Tradition 
Livy’s digression stands in contrast to the numerous examples of artwork adopted 
into Roman culture and politics, which were meant to tie the reputation of Alexander to 
the Romans in order to create a sense of kindred greatness.
314
 It is significant that Livy 
selected Alexander as his counterfactual subject since this recognized Alexander’s 
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position as the greatest conqueror of all time. When Livy states that “the power of Rome 
would not have been conquered by Alexander any more than by other kings and 
peoples,” he accomplishes two things. On the one hand, he isolates Alexander from all 
others and acknowledges the common belief of Alexander as the single most significant 
conqueror in history.
315
 Yet on the other, he reduces Alexander to approximately the 
same level as “other kings and peoples,” in order to challenge the idea of his unrivalled 
superiority. Livy’s desire to promote Rome to the highest level led him to choose 
Alexander as the competitor. We should not overlook the significance of Livy’s mere 
attempt to create this digression, because it points directly to the lingering reputation of 
Alexander the Great on the new world power, Rome.  
In his digression, Livy decided to create a hypothetical invasion of Italy by 
Alexander, at some time after his vast Asian conquests. To be sure, this is counterfactual 
history; however, there was a well established tradition of the threat of Alexander to Italy 
and his designs to wage war against the Romans. Several of our surviving texts address it 
in some form or fashion. I have listed them below in chronological order. We should 
notice how the message becomes more focused on a clash between Alexander and Rome 
the later the source.  
In discussing the memoranda of Alexander’s orders produced by his general 
Perdiccas after the king’s death, Diodorus Siculus is the first and weakest example. He 
records the following:  
It was proposed to build a thousand warships, larger than triremes, in 
Phoenicia, Syria, Cilicia, and Cyprus for the campaign against the 
Carthaginians and the others who live along the coast of Libya and Iberia 
and the adjoining coastal region as far as Sicily; to make a road along the 
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coast of Libya as far as the Pillars of Heracles and, as needed by so great 




Curtius Rufus, discussing the vast plans that Alexander held on his return to Persia, 
states: 
Alexander himself, having embraced infinite plans in his mind, had 
determined, after thoroughly subduing the entire seacoast of the Orient, to 
cross from Syria to Africa, being incensed against the Carthaginians, then 
passing through the deserts of Numidia, to direct his course to Gades – for 
the report had spread abroad that the pillars of Heracles were there – then 
to visit Spain, which the Greeks called Hiberia from the river Hiberus, to 
approach and skirt the Alps and the seacoast of Italy, from which it is only 




In his history of Pyrrhus, Plutarch relates the speech of Appius Claudius Caescus, who, as 
stated previously, argued against coming to terms of peace with Pyrrus in 280 B.C.E., as 
follows:  
“For what becomes of the words that you are ever reiterating to all the 
world, namely, that if the great Alexander of renown had come to Italy 
and had come into conflict with us, when we were young men, and with 
our fathers, when they were in their prime, he would not now be 
celebrated as invincible, but would either have fled, or, perhaps, have 
fallen there, and so have left Rome more glorious still? Surely you are 
proving that this was boasting and empty bluster, since you are afraid of 
Chaonians and Molossians, who were ever the prey of the Macedonians, 
and you tremble before Pyrrhus, who has ever been a minister and servitor 




In his account of the aftermath of Alexander’s death, Arrian states that some writers 
“assert that he [Alexander] intended to go to Sicily and the Iapygian Cape [southern 
Italy], for the fame of the Romans spreading far and wide was already causing him 
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 While Julian, writing against the Christians of Alexandria, argues, “Nay, 
Ptolemy son of Lagus proved stronger than the Jews, while Alexander, if he had had to 
match himself with the Romans, would have made even them fight hard for 
supremacy.”
320
 Moreover, in reprimanding Emperor Valentinian’s bloodthirsty 
investigations and lack of mercy, Ammianus Marcellinus uses Papirius Cursor as one of 
the fine examples he could have aspired to emulate, relating the following story: 
A general of Praeneste in one of the Samnite wars had been ordered to 
hasten to his post, but had been slow to obey, and was summoned to 
expiate that misdeed; Papirius Cursor, who was dictator at the time, 
ordered the lictor to make ready his axe, and in sight of the man, who was 
overcome with terror and had given up hope of excusing himself, he gave 
orders that a bush seen near should be cut down, by a jest of this kind at 
the same time punishing and acquitting the man; and thereby he suffered 
no loss of respect, and he brought to an end the long and difficult wars of 
his fathers and was considered the only man capable of resisting 




In his brief discussion of the Second Samnite War, Orosius states, “Papirius enjoyed at 
that time a great reputation among the Romans for valor and energy in war; so much so 
that when Alexander the Great was reported to be arranging an expedition from the East 
to occupy Africa and thence to cross to Italy, the Romans considered Papirius the best 
fitted of all generals in the Republic to withstand his attack.”
322
 Finally, Joannes 
Laurentius Lydus, who wrote in the sixth century C.E., recorded a similar story.
323
 This 
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tradition is significant for our understanding of the relationship between Roman thought 
and Alexander, since there is little evidence to suggest that it was contemporary with 
Alexander, and therefore was a creation of later Roman writers.
324
 The tradition not only 
attempted to represent Rome and Italy as areas of relative international importance in the 
late forth century B.C.E. It also compared a young Roman state, which would rise to 
dominance in the Mediterranean world, favorably to the mightiest conqueror in all of 
history.  
Later tradition had it that Alexander the Great, in a response to piratical activities 
in Italy, requested that Rome help eliminate such activities, appealing to a common 
kinship between Greeks and Romans.
325
 In another story about contact between 
Alexander and the Romans, Memnon recorded that the great king offered the Romans 
wise advice on how to deal with their enemies in Italy, and on the eve of the Persian 
expedition, supposedly received a gold crown from them.
326
 Pliny the Elder states that 
Cleitarchus recorded a Roman embassy to Alexander in Babylon.
327
 In discussing this 
last instance of alleged direct contact between Rome and Alexander, Erich Gruen 
observes, “The truth of that statement remains in dispute, sometimes categorically denied, 
sometimes ingenuously defended. For our purposes it suffices to observe that one 
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contemporary historian of Alexander [Cleitarchus] saw fit to remark on (or invent) 
Romans dispatching a mission to the Macedonian monarch.”
328
 Thus, there seems to have 
been a tendency to associate Alexander with the Romans from an early date. Later writers 
continued and expanded this tradition. Additionally, the practice of establishing 
Alexander as a threat to Rome and discussing his plans to conquer Italy was an 
adaptation of this tradition. 
Arrian and Curtius Rufus, who recorded Alexander’s possible plans to invade 
Italy, produced no accounts of direct Roman contact with Alexander. Nevertheless, these 
accounts aimed to accomplish the same goal, which was to create a connection between 
the present greatness of Alexander and the future greatness of Rome. This connection 
was recorded, (with Cleitarchus as the one possible exception), by later writers who had 
witnessed Rome’s rise. Gruen states, “The dramatic possibilities of encounter between 
the western power [Rome] and the greatest of Hellenic conquerors [Alexander] impressed 
themselves only upon writers of much later.”
329
 With that in mind, Cleitarchus’ story 
displayed Alexander as a political scientist or philosopher who was made to “inquire after 
the nature of Rome’s constitution, to comment on the demeanor and the independence of 
her representatives, and to predict her future greatness. Transparent inventions, all of it---
but not something a third-century [B.C.E.] writer would be moved to invent.”
330
 Thus, 
even Cleitarchus’ account followed in the tradition of connecting the known greatness of 
                                                 
328








Alexander with the future greatness of Rome. So, too, Cleitarchus’ reasons for recording 
this event were different from those of the later writers.  
Fictitious or not, the reference to Roman emissaries in Cleitarchus’ work 
“constitutes but an incidental item in the registry of distant peoples come to pay respect 
to Alexander the Great. Rome as an intrinsic object of interest had not yet captured 
Hellenic fancy.”
331
 Cleitarchus may not have been attempting to associate Rome with the 
greatness of Alexander. Yet, later Roman and Greek writers were making a deliberate 
connection between Alexander and Rome. They continued a tradition that ran from the 
third century B.C.E. well into Late Antiquity. 
This tradition allowed Romans, and those recording the rise of Rome to 
dominance, to portray Rome’s international importance even early in its history. The 
connection was also important in helping establish Rome as a power worthy of following 
in Alexander’s footsteps in its eventual ascendancy over the new world created by 
Alexander. With the advent of Alexander and his conquests, the old concept of oikumenē, 
which means “the inhabited world,” took on a new meaning. Hence, Karl Galinsky states, 
“Oikumenē came to denote not only the changed geography, which included the Middle 
East and parts of Asia, but also its social, political, and ethnic dimensions. A 
cosmopolitan variety of peoples and cultures lived under the aegis of a ruling power.”
332
 
Even though Alexander’s death brought an end to this unified power under his 
successors, the concept of oikumenē persisted both culturally and physically. Political 
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reunification of this new world was also an idea that persevered. Galinsky continues, 
“Polybius commenced his Histories in the second century B.C. by reminding the Romans 
of this role, and Alexander the Great became the inspirational role model for subsequent 
Roman leaders.”
333
 The tradition of a connection between Alexander and the Romans is 
significant not only because it helped describe the rise of Rome as a new world power 
moving toward greatness, as we witnessed in Polybius’ work, but it also helped the 
Romans of Livy’s period to characterize their own successes via their alignment within 
the order of the greatest empires of history.  
The connection was deliberate and has far-reaching implications. Rome became 
universally understood as Alexander’s true successor. However, Polybius’ and Livy’s 
works, and their adaptation of this tradition, use this connection to represent the Romans 
as surpassing the great accomplishments of Alexander. Their reasons for pursuing this 
line of thought, which often placed them in a position to make strained arguments and 
incorrect assertions, stemmed from an opinion, cultivated through the development of 
their works on the rise of Rome, that Alexander may have been great but the Romans 
were simply greater. Livy’s digression on Alexander is a fundamental example of the 
importance of Alexander’s connection to the Romans, as well as being a clearly pro-
Roman discussion of that connection. 
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Livy’s Digression on Alexander 
With a solid understanding of how Alexander the Great features in Livy’s work 
outside of the digression, an awareness of the historiographical context in which the 
digression is set, and an appreciation for how the digression would have been understood 
by Livy’s Roman audience as a continuation of an already established tradition of 
significant interest, we shall now focus directly on the digression itself. This study has 
illustrated that Livy possessed a deep respect for the vast accomplishments of Alexander. 
Likewise, it has demonstrated that Livy’s ultimate theme was to establish the Romans as 
superior to Alexander’s greatness. No section in Livy’s entire history advances this point 
more clearly than his digression.  
It is important first to lay out the basic organization and argument of the 
digression. Livy argues that Alexander would have failed in his invasion and that his 
early death saved him from the wrath of Fortune.
334
 He then favorably compares Roman 
generals and the Roman state with Alexander.
335
 Livy next disparages the military ability 
of Alexander’s historical enemies, comparing him to Darius III.
336
 Following this, Livy 
attacks Alexander’s character and reputation.
337
 Livy then introduces his “one Alexander 
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versus the many of Rome” theme.
338
 After this, he describes how Alexander’s eastern 
army would have been no match for Roman soldiers.
339
 Livy finishes the digression by 
emphasizing later Roman victories over the Macedonians.
340
 
From its beginning to its conclusion, the digression is consistently hostile to the 
Macedonian king. The digression then continues in the rhetorical tradition of a 
comparatio, where someone compares two things and presents one as superior.
341
 Thus, 
we must keep in mind that the digression, by its very nature, promoted a patriotic and 
radical stand on the part of Livy.
342
 It is this vibrant eagerness to promote the greatness of 
Rome over that of Alexander that causes numerous oversights and exaggerations in the 
text. This of course makes the digression highly problematic even as “counterfactual 
history.” A thorough analysis of the digression will substantiate how comparisons with 
Alexander, because of his reputation and the respect that he commanded in the late 
Roman Republic, came to help determine the Romans’ view of Rome’s role in the world 
and even partially what it meant to be Roman. 
After Livy portrays Lucius Papirius Cursor as a possible match for Alexander had 
he invaded Italy, he breaks away from his narrative and turns his attention to the 
digression.
343
 He prefaces the section with an apology for departing from the order of 
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events, which he admits was not his originally intention.
344
 To some, this statement has 
added to the triviality of the digression; but a greater sensitivity to the digression’s 
various influences on Livy’s history and the importance of Alexander in Livy’s 
establishment of Roman superiority corroborates the significance of the digression.
345
  
As previously noted, Livy explains that “the very mention of so great a king and 
commander evokes certain thoughts on which I have often brooded in silence, and 
disposes me to enquire how the Roman State would have fared in a war with 
Alexander.”
346
 He here alludes to the previous section. Alexander and how his 
accomplishments compared to those of Rome were topics that interested the Romans. For 
Livy, who believed Rome was Alexander’s true successor and a rival to his greatness, the 
digression was a necessary addition to his history.
347
  Morello’s article impressively 
demonstrates the impact that the digression had on the preceding books of Livy’s history, 
especially involving Alexander of Epirus and Lucius Papirius Cursor.
348
 However, this 
study has illustrated that the digression continues to influence our interpretation of 
passages in Livy all the way through to Book 45, the last extant book of his history. 
Ultimately, the digression stands as the primary example of Livy’s consistent argument 
for Roman supremacy in greatness over all others, even Alexander. Arguably, Livy’s 
opinions are often flawed. However, these flaws only illustrate that through the 
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digression, Livy thought he could definitively establish the Romans as superior to the 
great Macedonian. 
Alexander the Lucky? 
Livy begins his digression by recording the four factors he considered of chief 
importance in war: numbers, the valor of the soldiers, command ability, and above all 
Fortune.
349
 Livy believes that all of these elements favored the Romans and assured 
Roman invincibility.
350
 It is notable that Livy already refers to Alexander as invincible in 
war.
351
 The contradiction is apparent. Still, the digression also implies that Livy thought 
that Alexander would have proved invincible up to the moment he invaded Italy and 
faced the Romans. 
Livy recognizes Alexander as a masterful commander but faults him for his 
relatively youthful death, an issue that this study will address presently. Livy’s text thus 
characterizes Alexander as unique; however, he portrays this uniqueness as negative.
352
 
Unlike Plutarch, who favored Alexander and compared his fortune favorably to the 
fortune of Rome, Livy used his digression in an attempt to establish Roman superiority in 
both fortune and virtue.
353
 Oakley also maintains that Greeks tended to champion 
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Alexander over Rome and that Livy was responding to these Greeks.
354
 It is worth noting 
that this makes Polybius’ stance in opposition to this trend even more significant. 
In an attempt to argue that Alexander’s premature death was a major benefit to his 
legend, Livy states, “I do not dispute that Alexander was an exceptional general, but his 
reputation is enhanced by the fact that he died while still young (adulescens) and before 
he had time to experience any change of fortune.”
355
 Alexander was thirty-two when he 
died at Babylon in early June 323 B.C.E. His extensive military career began when he 
was eighteen. Therefore, to call him young, as if he was not already an experienced man, 
is inappropriate. To be sure, Alexander was not old by any means, but in the ancient 
world a thirty-two year old man who had been on almost continual campaign for nearly 
fifteen years should not be considered young.
356
 In addition, the idea that Fortune had not 
taken her cruel toll on Alexander is also misplaced. Even so, these arguments do attempt 
to diminish the supposed unrivalled greatness of Alexander.
357
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The Sole Alexander versus the Multitude of Rome 
Livy then described the multiple strong willed and militarily talented Roman 
commanders whom Alexander would have faced had he invaded Italy in this period. In 
this section, Livy argues for the superiority of the Roman generals through their 
discipline, tactics, and counsel.
358
 He portrayed the Roman generals as no less fortunate 
in war and as overcoming greater odds.
359
 In addition, he illustrated the Roman army as 
tactically superior to that of Macedon.
360
  
The digression notes eleven Roman statesmen of the late fourth century B.C.E.
361
 
Livy boasts that these eleven men were all “gifted with the same qualities of courage and 
natural ability as Alexander.”
362
 Livy went on to claim that these Roman statesmen would 
have matched Alexander in battlefield bravery and hand-to-hand combat ability. 
However, we must state that, of the eleven generals that Livy mentioned, three were too 
old to be of an age with Alexander and three were too young.
363
 This helps demonstrate 
the problems associated with Livy’s arguments in the digression.  
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 Livy mentions, “M. Valerius Corvus, C. Marcius Rutilus, C. Sulpicius, T. Manlius Torquatus, 
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Livy also made the argument that Alexander would have been no match for the 
Senate of Rome.
364
 He adopted a technique of Catonian historiography here by advancing 
the “one versus many” motif.
365
 Again, Livy contradicts himself, this time within the 
confines of the digression, at 9.18.12, when he urges fair one-on-one comparison.
366
 With 
Rome’s name at stake, Livy abandoned this belief and argued that “the collective ‘Roman 
name’ transcends all other Roman names, and outweighs that of Alexander, as Rome’s 
history outweighs his magnitudo.”
367
 Livy states,  
However lofty our ideas of this man's [Alexander’s] greatness, still it is the 
greatness of one individual, attained in a successful career of little more 
than ten years. Those who extol it on the ground that though Rome has 
never lost a war she has lost many battle, whilst Alexander has never 
fought a battle unsuccessfully, are not aware that they are comparing the 
actions of one individual, and he a youth, with the achievements of a 




Livy’s text portrays Alexander as up against all of Rome. Livy thought that this 
discrepancy in numbers would prove too daunting.
369
 This comparison of Alexander with 
figures from the entirety of Roman history further connects the theme of claiming Roman 
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superiority to Alexander in the digression with those similar examples found elsewhere in 
Livy’s extant work.  
Additionally, when Livy depicts the Roman legion as superior to the Macedonian 
phalanx, like Polybius did, his text emphasizes the flexibility of the multiple sections of 
the legion as opposed to the alleged immobile and unified phalanx.
370
 Thus, Alexander 
and his army were no match for a multifaceted Rome on a whole variety of levels. In 
discussing Polybius 18.32 previously, we already addressed the distortion of this 
comparison. In this passage, Livy clearly portrays his own people as better than 
Alexander, and makes a similar distorted comparison. 
Eastern Inferiority? 
At several points in the digression, Livy made it a point to downplay Alexander’s 
vast conquests by attacking the military power of those he conquered. He refers to the 
Persian King Darius III as “easy prey rather than an enemy.”
371
 There is no mention of 
the immense armies commanded by Darius, nor does Livy seem to have appreciated here 
that Alexander was outnumbered significantly at Issus and Gaugamela.
372
 Livy 
immediately followed by referring to India as a less daunting obstacle to conquer than 
                                                 
370
 Livy, 9.19.8 Note also Morello, “Livy’s Alexander Digression,” 78; and Oakley, Commentary 
III, 252. 
371
 Livy 9.17.16 
 
372
 At Issus and Gaugamela Darius outnumbered Alexander at least two to one. See Carey, 







 However, the sheer difference in size between southern Italy and Pakistan seems 
to refute this claim.
374
  
Alexander was forced to traverse mountains, deserts, large rivers, and jungle in 
northern Pakistan, while constantly battling hostile tribes.
375
 One also could argue that 
until Alexander neared Campania there would have been little, if any, military resistance 
by the tribes and cities of southern Italy because of their hostility toward Rome at the 
time when he would have arrived. Indeed, Alexander would have arrived at a time when 
Rome was a limited central Italian power surrounded by vicious enemies who more than 
likely would have willingly aided Alexander in a war against Rome or at the very least 
would have remained hostilely neutral to Rome. Alexander of Epirus, who was 
Alexander’s uncle, Pyrrhus, and Hannibal all found willing allies in southern Italy to 
combat Rome. Livy’s account of Publius Sulpicius’ war proposal speech against Philip V 
in 200 B.C.E. speaks about the various southern Italian peoples that willingly joined 
Pyrrhus and Hannibal. Sulpicius argued that these same people would be willing to join 
Philip V if that king should invade Italy.
376
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Demonstrated by the freedom and speed of movement enjoyed by Pyrrhus during 
the Pyrrhic War and Hannibal during the Second Punic War, southern Italy does not offer 
many daunting obstacles to the march of large armies. In fact, both commanders had the 
opportunity to besiege Rome during their campaigns.
377
 Livy relates the famous quote of 
Maharbal, Hannibal’s cavalry commander, as follows, “Then said Maharbal, ‘In very 
truth the gods bestow not on the same man all their gifts; you know how to gain a victory, 
Hannibal: you know not how to use one.’ That day’s delay is generally believed to have 
saved the City and the empire.”
378
 Until an enemy army approached the Monte Cassino 
region of Campania, the natural obstacles of southern Italy would not have proved as 
intimidating as Livy argues.
379
 On paper, Italy south of Rome does not appear more 
daunting than the whole Indus River valley; however, much like Polybius’ attempts to 
depreciate the territorial gains of Alexander in favor of Roman conquests (1.2), Livy 
challenged the achievements of Alexander in order to make them more comparable with 
those of Rome.  
Livy then refers to any Persian or Indian troops that Alexander could have called 
upon to aid in his Italian invasion as more of “an encumbrance to drag around with him 
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 Livy remarks that after getting a taste of Roman arms in battle, 
“Alexander would have wished to confront Persians and Indians and unwarlike Asians, 
and would have admitted he had hitherto been at war with women, as Alexander, King of 
Epirus, is reported to have said when mortally wounded, contrasting the type of war 
waged by this very youth [Alexander the Great] in Asia, with that which had fallen to his 
own share.”
381
 By this charged remark, it is quite obvious that Livy had little respect for 
easterners and their previously attested lack of military prowess; however, these 
statements are highly prejudice and generally ill-founded.
382
  
The crushing defeat of M. Licinius Crassus at the Battle of Carrhae in 53 B.C.E. 
by a smaller, lighter, and swifter Parthian army is a clear example of the might of eastern 
arms.
383
 The triumvir Marcus Antonius also suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of 
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the Parthians in 36 B.C.E.
384
 Augustus, who brought numerous territories and peoples 
under the Roman yoke during his reign, made no major military attempts against the 
Parthians and established a peaceful relationship that lasted until the reign of Nero.
385
 
Perhaps Augustus did not share Livy’s contempt for the military prowess of easterners. 
The powers of the East proved a difficult challenge for Rome. Rome’s multiple failures 
over the course of its history to conquer the East only make Alexander’s 
accomplishments all the more impressive. However, by arguing for the weakness of 
Alexander’s enemies and emphasizing the strength of Rome’s military might, we see 
Livy seeking to establish Roman superiority over Alexander. 
The Old Alexander as Darius III and Rome as a Young Alexander  
One of the most striking segments of the digression is where Livy attacks 
Alexander by arguing that by the time Alexander had been able to attack Italy, “he would 
have been more like Darius than Alexander . . . leading an army which had already 
forgotten its Macedonian origins and was adopting degenerate Persian habits.”
386
 Clearly, 
Livy thought that prolonged exposure to the East had a corrupting influence. Livy also 
argued that even the warlike Macedonians experienced this transformation. However, 
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Oakley correctly emphasizes the Macedonian resistance to Alexander’s attempts at 
easternizing.
387
 Livy here makes a vague and unfair assumption.  
Additionally, Alexander’s army never became a foreign mass of various Persian 
and barbaric warriors. Alexander trained many of his new eastern subjects in the 
Macedonian fighting style with Macedonian equipment.
388
 Even at the end of 
Alexander’s eastern conquests, the core of his army was the Macedonian phalanx, which 
Livy himself described as “unconquered on level ground and in a regular battle.”
389
 In 
addition, Livy immediately contradicts his above assertion in the following section, 
stating, “He himself [Alexander] would have crossed the sea with veteran Macedonians 
to the number of not more than thirty thousand foot and four thousand horse - mostly 
Thessalians - for this was his main strength.”
390
 This would not have been an 
insignificant Macedonian force, and it would have rivaled closely the army Alexander 
took into Asia Minor in 334 B.C.E.
391
 However, for our purposes, by making these 
oversights, Livy likened the easternized Alexander to Darius.  
We should remember Livy’s account of the eastern army led by Antiochus, and 
the Roman victory over him at Magnesia, which parallels Alexander’s victory over 
Darius at Gaugamela.
392
 Just as the Romans had crushed Antiochus at Magnesia, this 
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Persian-influenced Alexander would have failed in Italy. Again, we see Livy relating 
Rome’s enemies to Darius. In addition, by equating the older “degenerate” Alexander to 
Darius, Livy’s text equates the Romans to the younger invincible Alexander. Thus, in this 
passage, even though Livy has a flawed argument, he emphasizes Rome as both the new 
Alexander and the great king’s superior. 
Livy’s Hostility toward Easterners in the Digression 
There were at least two underlying motives for Livy’s attacks on easterners and 
Alexander. First, Livy’s digression emphasizes the alleged traditional shortcomings 
equated with Alexander the Great, while at the same time ignoring or downplaying his 
military accomplishments so as to decrease the apparent greatness of Alexander to a level 
more obtainable for the fourth century Romans. Second, the events of Livy’s own day 
called for a deprecation of eastern peoples and a need to defend Rome.
393
 Ogilvie 
emphasizes this point, stating, “Contemporary Greek historians were at this time 
comparing the Romans unfavorably with the Parthians.”
394
 Livy thus was attempting to 
establish “the superiority of the Romans in the face of all comers.”
395
 Livy’s contempt for 
easterners led him to make a strained attack on Alexander. 
Even though the digression is continually hostile to Alexander, the fact that 
Alexander was the focus illustrates that Livy had a respect for Alexander’s military 
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reputation. We know this already, of course, from the depictions of Alexander outside of 
the digression, where Livy even described him as invincible.
396
 The digression alone, just 
as with Polybius’ negative opinion of Alexander’s sack of Thebes, cannot determine 
Livy’s overall opinion of Alexander. This we discover after looking at all of the examples 
found throughout the history. 
Roman Military Superiority over Macedon 
In a further attempt to demonstrate Roman dominance over Macedonian arms, 
Livy makes another deceptive statement: “The Romans have indeed had experience of 
the Macedonians in war, admittedly not when they were led by Alexander and their 
fortunes still stood high, but in the Roman campaigns against Antiochus, Philip, and 
Perseus, and not only without any defeat but even without danger to themselves.”
397
 To 
begin with, this is incorrect since Philip’s Macedonian phalanx defeated the Romans in 
198 B.C.E. at Atrax.
398
 In addition, it is surprising that Livy would even bother to make 
such a statement since it possesses little to no relevance on the topic of a hypothetical 
invasion by Alexander the Great. Simply because a much stronger Roman state came to 
dominate the weaker Successor kingdoms in the second century B.C.E. would not 
automatically predict the guaranteed success of a weaker Rome over Alexander the Great 
himself in the late forth century B.C.E.  
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There is a parallel in thought here with Polybius 18.31-2, where all the 
Macedonians are lumped together and he minimizes the difference between the Macedon 
of Alexander and of Perseus. The only purpose that the above boastful statement about 
Rome’s invincibility serves is to continue claiming the superiority of Roman arms to 
those of Alexander’s successors. The message comes full circle when Livy concludes, 
“But they [the Romans] have defeated, and will defeat, a thousand armies more 
formidable than those of Alexander and the Macedonians, provided that the same love of 
peace and solicitude about domestic harmony, in which we now live, continue 
permanent.”
399
 Livy’s bluster here makes plain his belief in Roman superiority. 
Final Thoughts on the Digression 
Livy’s digression is the prime example of his theme of representing the Romans 
as greater than Alexander. Yet, it is not the entire story: the theme appears subtly 
elsewhere. Additionally, in the digression Livy fails to grasp the political and temporal 
realities of the late fourth century B.C.E. Mediterranean world. Livy fails to understand 
that Alexander, if he had survived his illness, would have made his hypothetical invasion 
prior to the Roman dominance of all of Italy, or even all of central Italy. The use of 
strained arguments by Livy in order to assert why Alexander would have failed is 
noticeable. Livy’s approach is sloppy, biased, and unsupported by good evidence. It is a 
clear example of propaganda. 
Once we include all the Alexander passages in the discussion, it becomes clear 
that Livy respected Alexander as a great warrior but, much like Polybius, Rome to him 
was ultimately greater. Livy was willing to undervalue Alexander and his conquest when 
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faced with comparing the great Macedonian with his own people.  In fact, he was forced 
to do this in order to make the fourth century B.C.E. Romans a possible match for 
Alexander and even superior to him. The inferiority complex of the Romans with regard 
to Alexander the Great and his accomplishments plays a role here. The digression, 
although misleading and unfair, serves this purpose. Additionally, for this study, it further 






The continual impact of Alexander the Great on the issues that the ancients 
thought were important in history and on their interpretation of Roman history is 
undeniable. Alexander highly influenced Greek and Roman culture, literature, and art. It 
is no coincidence that many great Roman statesmen respected the illustrious 
Macedonian’s accomplishments, and it should come as no surprise that numerous 
ancients dealt with the impact of Alexander the Great in their thinking and writing. This 
study has discussed the influence of Alexander on the histories of Polybius and Livy. 
This study also has endeavored to establish a more careful and nuanced consideration of 
Polybius’ and Livy’s attitudes toward Alexander, which the majority of modern 
scholarship tends to under-appreciate. It illustrates clearly that Alexander’s influence on 
the writings of Polybius and Livy was important to their methods of writing and 
functional to their ideology. 
What is clear from examining the Alexander passages found in the histories of 
Polybius and Livy is that they both possessed generally positive opinions of the great 
Macedonian. However, we should not consider either writer as a sycophant or an 
Alexander apologist. Polybius’ criticism of Alexander’s sack of Thebes and Livy’s 
attacks on the “older, degenerate” Alexander in his digression makes this clear. A 
complete study of their works produces a full, balanced account of their opinions, which 
one cannot consider as generally negative. Both men consistently showed respect for 




Rome with Alexander exist because of this respect for his greatness. The issue is not 
whether Polybius and Livy disliked Alexander and why; rather, it is why they believed 
the Romans were the greatest power of all time and how they utilized Alexander to 
portray this theme.  
Polybius and Livy obviously were not the only writers who felt a need to address 
Alexander in their work. Yet, what makes Polybius’ and Livy’s accounts interesting is 
that, unlike the examples of emulation, apologetics, and consistent praise found in many 
ancient sources, these two writers addressed the impact of Alexander in a different and 
sometimes less flattering manner. They wrestled with their divided personal feelings on 
Alexander, the mighty conqueror, and Alexander, the potential rival of Rome. These 
histories offer a fascinating twist on the kind of influence Alexander’s spirit and image 
imposed on the tradition of Roman history. A main reason for this different perspective 
on Alexander is the confines within which Polybius and Livy were writing, namely the 
history of Rome’s rise to dominance in the ancient Mediterranean world and Rome’s 
conquest of the Hellenic world created by Alexander.
400
 Polybius and Livy used 
Alexander and his image as a role model for military ability, as a warning against the 
corruption of success, and as a rival interchangeably. Polybius and Livy altered 
Alexander to suit whatever context and whatever theme they wished to portray.  
As illustrated in this study, in both Polybius’ and Livy’s works this desire to 
represent the Romans as superior to Alexander led to shortsighted logic in arguments and 
the manipulation of detail in some of the Alexander passages. Contesting the greatness of 
Alexander does not come easily. In many instances, Polybius and Livy produced flawed 
arguments for Roman superiority. All the same, the passages in these two ancient 
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accounts involving Alexander and his Macedonians in conflict with the Romans are an 
important and underappreciated aspect of their histories. 
This study strove to accomplish five primary goals: to produce a distinctive 
commentary on the various passages found in Polybius’ and Livy’s histories where they 
either directly mention Alexander or where we can infer an Alexander reference from the 
contexts; to establish the overall positive opinions of Alexander held by these two 
writers; to illustrate that an important theme of their works was the comparison between 
Alexander and Rome; to demonstrate that Polybius and Livy thought that the Romans 
were superior even to Alexander; and finally to create an understanding of how this motif 
influenced their larger narratives and alters our appreciation of their works. This author 
hopes that these goals were accomplished and that this study will spark controversy and 
conversation about our previously held ideas of the purpose of Alexander in the histories 
of Polybius and Livy, such as the alleged negative opinion of Alexander held by Polybius 
and the fundamental purpose of Livy’s digression within his larger narrative. The efforts 
of Polybius and Livy to challenge the unrivalled greatness of Alexander in the favor of 
Rome, which (as Alexander’s true successor) had come to dominate the world left behind 
by this mighty warrior, helps to represent further the great king’s immense and unrivaled 
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